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IN order to sponsor the construction and operation of public works, which
are increasingly important in an era of urban and industrial development,
government has developed a specialized unit-the public authority. In the
recent past, authorities have financed new turnpikes, terminal facilities, market-
places, water systems, school and government office buildings, and even a
planetarium. Commonplace as they are, these institutions nonetheless raise
constitutional problems. Specifically, the debt-financing of an authority may
involve a violation of restrictions on governmental borrowing. True, compared
to a building authority, an operating authority may provoke few such difficul-
ties, for its debt-retired with payments from the commercial users of the
facility in question-can be deemed nongovernmental. A building authority, on
the other hand, ordinarily finances a construction project by borrowing funds,
renting its completed project to a unit of government, and repaying its debt
out of the rent. Since the building authority is thus dependent on a government
for its income, its debt may be treated as the government's. Building authori-
ties therefore may encounter the limitations on permissible governmental debt
found in the various state constitutions.
Adopted by the states in the nineteenth century in response to financial
embarrassments, these constitutional restrictions on governmental debt survive
today to inhibit the construction of utilities and other public works which are
too expensive to be paid for with current revenues. Consequently, evasive
devices and fine distinctions are employed to escape debt limitations. Building
authorities are the most recent of these devices. However, they involve undue
costs which make difficult the achievement of contemporarily desirable public-
works projects.
This article, first, will examine and analyze the legal doctrines utilized to
justify building authorities' circumvention of debt limitations and, in con-
clusion, will attempt an evaluation of the building authority device. By way of
introduction to this analysis and evaluation, the article will discuss the origin
and nature of public authorities and of debt limitations in state constitutions.
BACKGROUND
Development and Nature of Public Authorities
Although two units of local government in Maine assumed authority form
at the close of the nineteenth century,' the public authority device has developed
fAssociate Professor of Law, Rutgers University School of Law.
1. The Kennebec Water District, incorporated in 1899, is the first reported public
authority which received judicial approval. Kennebec Water Dist. v. City of Waterville,
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principally in the past four decades. The Port of New York Authority, the
first public authority of renown and the one which gave these organizations
their generic name, was created in 1921.2 A few similar organizations were
created in the same decade,3 but their proliferation awaited the New Deal,
under which public works became a matter of national policy and the federal
government encouraged the establishment of local authorities in aid of public
housing and other projects. 4 Since World War II, an authority boom has
96 le. 234, 52 At!. 774 (1902). An act creating the Waterville New City Hall Commission,
the earliest attempted public authority reported, was held unconstitutional in Reynolds v.
City of Waterville, 92 Me. 292, 42 At. 553 (1898).
2. 42 Stat. 174 (1921). The Port of New York Authority in turn was named after
the Port of London Authority, which was so nominated because Lloyd George did not
want to use the common names, such as "commission," "board," or "agency." Having noticed
that each section of the draft enabling act began "Authority is hereby given . . .," he sug-
gested the name "Port of London Authority." COHEN, THEY BUILDED BErER THAN
THEY KNEW 290 (1946). Other public authorities, such as the Pennsylvania Turnpike
Commission, are not so designated. And some organizations called authorities, such as
the Tennessee Valley Authority, are not "public authorities" as that phrase is here used
since they lack the financial autonomy characteristic of those public-works organizations
which depend principally upon the money market for capital.
3. E.g., South Jersey Port Commission (1926), Alabama State Bridge Corporation
(1926), Board of Commissioners of the Port of New Orleans (1928), Niagara Frontier Com-
mission (1929). COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, PUBLIC AUTHORITIES IN THE STATES
23, 25 (1953). Louisville Bridge Commission, Ky. Acts 1928, ch. 74, at 263.
4. Federal public works of primarily local benefit encountered constitutional difficul-
ties when the federal government was forbidden to condemn land for local housing projects.
United States v. Certain Lands in City of Louisville, 9 F. Supp. 137 (W.D. Ky.), aff'd,
78 F.2d 684 (6th Cir.), dismissed on iotion of the government, 294 U.S. 735 (1935).
Federal grants in aid to state and local governments for public works traditionally
had supplied only part of the cost of construction; the grantee government financed the
remainder. When the depression prevented state and local governments from matching
federal grants, the federal government lent the remainder, to preserve the tradition of
matched grants. WILLIAMS, GRANTS-IN-AID UNDER PUBLIC WORKS ADmINISTRATION
42, 48-49 (1939). However, the federal government feared legal hurdles to such a plan.
In December 1934, President Roosevelt wrote the governor of each state that:
In the event that an additional public works program is authorized at the coming
sssion of Congress, I should like to see the municipalities of your state legally
able to take full advantage of such a program. With this in mind, I have instructed
Administrator Ickes to place at your disposal the Legal Division of the Public
Works Administration for the purpose of suggesting bills which if enacted into law
would enable municipalities of your State to secure the benefits of this phase of the
recovery program.
Our experience in the past eighteen months has brought to light the difficulty of
gearing the legal machinery which has served municipalities of your State ade-
quately for decades to the speed with which the Federal Government must extend
credit to achieve desired results. It has been found that revision of the procedure
relative to municipal financing is essential, at least for the duration of the present
emergency ...
(Emphasis added.) The letter suggested either the extension of municipal powers to the
construction and finance of self-liquidating public-service enterprises or the creation of
new public corporations with such powers. Foley, Revenue Financing of Public Enter-
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spawned still more of these institutions at the state and local level. Despite the
occasional rises in interest rates which have dampened this boom, the public
authority is currently considered a normal institutional form for public-works
development. 5 In periods of prosperity, rapid urbanization, numerous auto-
mobiles, and high birth rates, new authorities build utility systems, roads and
schools. And in leaner years, when public works become instruments of
economic recovery, the federal government offers to lend local authorities
funds to stimulate employment-creating public construction.
Usually, the public authority has the following important characteristics
and methods of operation. It finances public works by borrowing, levies
charges calculated primarily to repay its debt, and, when the debt is retired,
customarily conveys the completed project to a traditional unit of government.
In form, practically all authorities at all levels of government are organized as
public corporations,6 with multistate authorities being created by interstate
prises, 35 Mlcn. L. RLV. 1, 5-6 (1936). Mr. Foley was the director of the legal division
of the PWA and actively advocated the creation of authorities, not only by advising state
governments pursuant to presidential command, but also by urging the legality and de-
sirability of authorities through articles in legal periodicals. See ibid; Foley, Some
Recent Developments in the Law Relating to Municipal Financing of Public Works, 4
FORDHAm L. REv. 13 (1935); Foley, The Case of Tierney v. Cohen, 5 FORDHAM L. Rnv.
73 (1936) ; Foley, Legal Aspects of Low-Rent Housing in New York, 6 FORDHAM L. Rev.
1 (1937); Foley, Low-Rent Housing and State Financing, 85 U. PA. L. REv. 239 (1937).
5. For example, President Eisenhower recently advocated federal legislation to en-
courage local school building authorities to help solve the current schoolroom shortage.
The President stated:
Many school districts cannot borrow to build schools because of restrictive debt
limits. They need some other form of financing. Therefore, [this] proposal is de-
signed to facilitate immediate construction of schools without local borrowing by
the school district.
To expand school construction, several States have already created special state-
wide school building agencies. These can borrow advantageously, since they repre-
sent the combined credit of many communities. After building schools, the agency
rents them to school districts. The local community under its lease gets a new
school without borrowing.
I now propose the wider adoption of this tested method of accelerating school con-
struction. Under this proposal the Federal Government would share with the States
in establishing and maintaining for State school-building agencies an initial reserve
fund equal to 1 year's payment on principal and interest.
The State school-building agency, working in cooperation with the State edu-
cational officials, would issue its bonds through the customary investment channels,
then build schools for lease to local school districts. Rentals would be sufficient to
cover the payments on principal and interest of the bonds outstanding.... In time, the
payments . . . would permit repayment of the initial Federal and State advances.
When all its financial obligations to the agency are met, the local school district
takes title to its building.
Message from the President of the United States, H.R. Doc. No. 84, 84th Cong., Ist Sess.
3 (1955).
6. Customarily, enabling acts describe authorities as "bodies public and corporate."
Some authorities, however, are not so designated and appear, from their enabling acts,
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compact 7 or an act of Congress," and those on the state level by special acts
of the legislature. In many jurisdictions, enabling legislation patterned after
general incorporation acts empowers county and municipal governments to
to be nothin but government bureaus. E.g., California Toll Bridge Authority, Pennsyl-
vania Turnpike Commission, State Bridge Commission of Ohio, Washington Toll Bridge
Commission, and West Virginia Turnpike Commission. However, the corporate norm
is so well established that the courts readily treat even these as corporations. Thus federal
courts have assumed diversity jurisdiction over suits against the Pennsylvania Turnpike
Commission despite objection that the eleventh amendment, depriving federal courts of
jurisdiction in suits against the states, prevented this action. "The fact that the com-
mission is not a corporation does not make it any less a distinct legal entity. It is an unin-
corporated association, sometimes called a quasi corporation, with power to sue and be
sued in its own name, and as such it assumes the citizenship of its members." Hunkin-
Conkey Const. Co. v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n, 34 F. Supp. 26, 28-29 (M.D. Pa.
1940). This case was followed in Lowes v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n, 125 F. Supp.
681 (M.D. Pa. 1954) ; Darby v. L. G. DeFelice & Son, 94 F. Supp. 535 (E.D. Pa. 1950).
Similarly, the West Virginia Turnpike Commission has been subjected to federal diversity
jurisdiction. Guaranty Trust Co. v. West Virginia Turnpike Comm'n, 109 F. Supp. 286
(S.D.W. Va. 1952).
Though the California Toll Bridge Authority has been held immune from federal
jurisdiction under the eleventh amendment because it is not a jural entity separate from
the state, Fowler v. California Toll Bridge Authority, 46 F. Supp. 299 (N.D. Calif. 1941),
it has been treated as a public corporation for other purposes, California Toll Bridge
Authority v. Kelly, 218 Cal. 7, 21 P.2d 425 (1933).
On the other hand, some courts have refused to recognize as corporations authorities
designated as corporations by their enabling acts. For example, the Indiana Toll Road
Commission Act was held not violative of the constitutional prohibition against special
corporate charters because the Commission was created for a public purpose and "despite
the fact that the commission is given the characteristics of a corporation, it is still a com-
mission of the State of Indiana." Ennis v. State Highway Comm'n, 231 Ind. 311, 324-25, 108
N.E.2d 687, 694 (1952).
Nor does an authority's corporate entity so separate it that it has none of the attributes
of government. Thus it may be sufficiently identified with the state to enjoy sovereign
immunity. For example, the South Carolina Public Service Authority is immune from
tort liability because it is "completely identified with the state in the performance of its
public functions [hydro-electric power], which are unquestionably of a governmental char-
acter." Rice Hope Plantation v. South Carolina Public Serv. Authority, 216 S.C. 500,
517, 59 S.E.2d 132, 138-39 (1950). Even the courts of Pennsylvania, which created a
corporate separateness, Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n v. Baldwin Bros., 44 Pa. D.
& C. 462 (C.P. 1942) (statute requiring notice within ninety days on all claims against
construction bonds given the Commonwealth held not to apply to bonds given the Com-
mission because it is a corporation separate from the Commonwealth), where the legislature
had not, granted the Commission sovereign immunity from actions in tort, House v.
Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n, 45 Pa. D. & C. 677 (C.P. 1942).
7. E.g., Port of New York Authority, 42 Stat. 174 (1921); Lake Champlain Bridge
Commission, 45 Stat. 120 (1928), 49 Stat. 736 (1935), 49 Stat. 1472 (1936); Delaware
River Port Authority, 47 Stat. 308 (1932), 66 Stat. 738 (1952) ; Maine-New Hampshire
Interstate Bridge Authority, 50 Stat. 538 (1937); Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Commis-
sion, 63 Stat. 930 (1949); Bi-State [Missouri-Illinois] Development Authority, 64 Stat.
568 (1950).
8. Congress has established a number of authorities to operate international and
interstate bridges. Omaha-Council Bluffs Missouri River Bridge Board of Trustees,
1953]
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create authorities by filing certificates in the nature of articles of incorporation. 9
In keeping with the corporate form, all authorities are governed by a board of
directors, never by one man. Some boards are elected, 10 but usually the directors
46 Stat. 544 (1930) ; Great Lakes Bridge Commission, 46 Stat. 809 (1930) ; St. Lawrence
Bridge Commission, 48 Stat. 141 (1933) ; Cairo Bridge Commission, 48 Stat. 577 (1934) ;
Oregon-Washington Bridge Board of Trustees, 48 Stat. 949 (1934) ; Port Arthur Bridge
Commission, 48 Stat. 1008 (1934); Sisterville Bridge Board of Trustees, 48 Stat. 1013
(1934); Niagara Falls Bridge Commission, 52 Stat. 767 (1938); Arkansas-Mississippi
Bridge Commission, 53 Stat. 747 (1939); Dubuque Bridge Commission, 53 Stat. 1051
(1939); Vicksburg Bridge Commission, 53 Stat. 1267 (1939); White County Bridge
Commission, 55 Stat. 140 (1941); Clinton Bridge Commission, 58 Stat. 846 (1944):
Sabine Lake Bridge & Causeway Authority, 65 Stat. 695 (1951) ; Muscatine Bridge Com-
mission, 70 Stat. 669 (1956).
The success of these authorities has varied. The Cairo Bridge Commission, created to
bridge the Mississippi and Ohio Rivers, completed its task, but the Oregon-Washington
Bridge Board of Trustees, established to bridge the Columbia near its mouth, never began
its project. Some authorities were instituted to take charge of existing facilities: the
Vicksburg Bridge Commission to manage a bankrupt private corporation's toll bridge,
and the Muscatine Bridge Commission to rebuild a bridge damaged by floods.
9. See, e.g., The Pennsylvania Municipality Authorities Act of 1945, PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 53, §§ 301-74 (1957). In Wisconsin, all public authorities are incorporated under the
general nonprofit incorporation statute. See State ex rel. Thomson v. Giessel, 265 Wis.
185, 60 N.W.2d 873 (1953) ; State ex rel. Thomson v. Giessel, 267 Wis. 331, 65 N.W.2d
529 (1954); Wis. STAT. §§ 15.96, 40.22, 40.305, 182.32-.48 (1955). This procedure i
apparently followed to avoid the constitutional prohibition against special charters of
incorporation. Indiana school building authorities are similarly incorporated under the
general incorporation act, IND. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-3220, -3221, -3223 (1948), §§ 28-3222,
-3224 to -3233 (Supp. 1955), as is the Kentucky Armory Board, COUNCIL OF STATE Gov-
ERNMENTS, op. cit. supra note 3, at 38.
Some housing authority legislation deviates slightly from this corporate pattern. The
Louisiana Housing Authority Act, for instance, purports to create a housing authority in
each city and parish, but the organization remains dormant until the governing board of
the city or parish declares by resolution that one is needed. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:391
(1950). South Carolina permitted the formation of county housing authorities by action
of the county's legislative delegation rather than its governing board. See Benjamin v.
Housing Authority, 198 S.C. 79, 15 S.E.2d 737 (1941). Some enabling acts require that
municipalities obtain permission from state officials before incorporating an authority.
E.g., Illinois Housing Authority Act., ILL Rv. STAT. ch. 67Y2, § 3 (1957).
New York City's attempt to create a power authority without special legislative per-
mission was invalidated in Tierney v. Cohen, 268 N.Y. 464, 198 N.E. 225 (1935). And
an act permitting private individuals to incorporate and manage a turnpike authority was
held unconstitutional insofar as it granted the authority tax-exempt status. Carolina-
Virginia Coastal Highway v. Coastal Turnpike Authority, 237 N.C. 52, 74 S.E.2d 310
(1953).
10. The directors of power authorities in Nebraska are chosen by the electorate of
the area in which the authorities provide electricity. NEm. Ray. STAT. ANN. §§ 70-601(2),
-609.01, -614.01 (1950). The Jamestown (R.I.) Bridge Commission is governed by a
committee elected at the town meeting. Powers ex reL. Foley v. Caswell, 79 R.I. 188, 86 A.2d
379 (1952). Housing Authorities in the towns (but not the cities) of Massachusetts consist
of one state-appointed and four locally elected members. MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 121, § 26
L (1957). The ex officio device also can result in an elected board of directors. For ex-
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are appointed by the unit of government sponsoring the authority 1 or, as
officers of that government, are directors ex officio.
12
The activities of public authorities are susceptible of various classifications,
but, for the purposes of this article, the distinction between operating and build-
ing authorities is of principal importance. An operating authority is, in a sense,
a publicly owned business in that it invariably directs enterprises, such as a
turnpike, sewerage system or airport, which earn commercial revenues from
private users. Accordingly, operating authorities are undertaken only after
study has indicated that business income will be adequate to meet their cur-
rent expenses and retire their debt. Building authorities, on the other hand,
have neither private customers nor commercial income. Instead, they con-
struct projects useful to some government, and then derive their income ex-
clusively from governmental rents. Typically, they construct schools and office
buildings to house state or municipal agencies, although some build roads or
ample, the Dade County (Fla.) Port Authority is composed of the Board of County
Commissioners who, pursuant to statute, adopted the port authority title and entered
the turnpike and airport business. See Florida State Turnpike Authority v. MacVicar,
67 So. 2d 210 (Fla. 1953).
11. Generally, the executive or governing board of the sponsoring unit of government
appoints the authority's board. Appointments to authority directorship on the state level
often require the concurrence of the senate.
Some boards are appointed by other officials, however. Members of the Housing
Authority of Darlington County, S.C., were selected by the state senator from that county.
Benjamin v. Housing Authority, 198 S.C. 79, 15 S.E.2d 737 (1941). In Pennsylvania, the
Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate each appoint one member to the
General State Authority and to the State Highway and Bridge Authority. PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 71, § 1707.2, tit. 36, § 3603 (Supp. 1957). The board of the Lower Neches Valley
(Texas) Authority is appointed by the State Board of Water Engineers, COuNCIL OF
STATE GOVERNMENTS, op. cit. supra note 3, at 45.
Generally, where an authority serves more than one community, some members of
the board are appointed by the government of each area. The Chicago Regional Port
District employs a novel device. Three members are appointed by the Mayor of Chicago
and four by the Governor of Illinois, but the Mayor's appointees must be approved by
the Governor and the Governor's appointees by the Mayor. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 19, § 164
(Supp. 1957).
12. Since public authorities' projects often are related closely to other government
activities, it is not unusual for the superior executive officer of a related government de-
partment to be a member of an authority's board ex officio The senior state highway
official, for instance, is often a member of a turnpike authority. Ex officio directors are
more common in building authorities than in operating authorities. COUNCIL OF STATE
GOVENtNMENTS, op. cit. supra note 3, at 41, 42. Although most ex officio directors are drawn
from the executive branch of government, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of
Georgia is a member of the Georgia State Office Building Authority, GA. CoDE AN.
§ 91-502a (Supp. 1955), and the Kansas Turnpike Authority includes the chairmen of
the house and senate highway committees. KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 68-2003 (Supp. 1957).
In Pennsylvania, the General State Authority and the State Highway and Bridge
Authority have, as directors, the Speaker of the House, the President pro tempore of
the Senate and the minority leaders of both houses. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1707.2, tit. 36,
§ 3603 (Supp. 1957).
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bridges which they rent to the local government for operation either as freeways
or toll facilities.
13
Building authorities may, on occasion, have potential private income, 14 but,
generally, they have not built projects in order to exploit a commercial market
and, in all but a few cases, their potential commercial earnings could never
cover operating costs and debt service. Thus, while operating authorities must
attract private capital by convincing the financial community that commercial
income will cover expenses, interest and amortization, building authorities
can attract investors on the basis of prospective government rentals alone,
irrespective of possible commercial income should the government abandon
the projects.
Constitutional Debt Restrictions and Their Exceptions
Since operating authorities appear financially separate from the govern-
ments which sponsor them, their debts have generally been upheld in the face
of constitutional debt limits. Building authorities, on the other hand, are
clearly integrated into their lessee-governments' fiscal patterns, and they have
been held unconstitutional or upheld only upon tortured reasoning.
The constitutions of all but eight states 15 limit the exercise of legislative
discretion with respect to state debt. In twenty jurisdictions, the problem
is left to the electorate's judgment by requiring a referendum before a signifi-
cant state debt may be incurred.16 In the remaining twenty,' 7 debt of any
13. The Georgia State Bridge Building Authority rents highways to the state for
toll-free operation. See GA. CODE ANN. § 95-2308 (Supp. 1955). The State Highway
and Bridge Authority of Pennsylvania also rents its projects to the state, and because of
their toll-free operation, its projects are eligible for and have received federal highway
aid funds. COUNcIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, op. cit. supra note 3, app. A, at 17. Among
the Florida State Improvement Commission's many projects, including buildings, bridges
and highways, some road projects are operated toll-free, while the Lower Tampa Bay
Bridge is operated by the state as a toll facility. Id. app. A, at 12-13; see State v. Florida
State Improvement Comm'n, 52 So. 2d 277 (Fla. 1951).
14. Should they cease renting to units of government, they could perhaps rent their
office buildings to private tenants. Their school buildings might have commercial value and
they could charge tolls on their highways and bridges.
15. Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Hampshire,
Tennessee and Vermont. In two, however, approval by more than a simple majority of the
legislature is necessary: Delaware requires three-fourths; Massachusetts, two-thirds. The
various state debt limits are more fully detailed in COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, Op.
cit. supra note 3, at 15-17.
16. Arkansas, California, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Missouri,
Montana, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, Virginia, Washington and Wyoming. Six of these also permit the legisla-
ture to exercise limited discretion so long as the state's debt does not exceed a specified
amount: California ($300,000), Idaho ($2,000,000), Kansas ($1,000,000), Maine ($2,000,-
000), Montana ($100,000), and Rhode Island ($50,000). Three others provide a variable
ceiling: New Jersey (1% of annual appropriations), North Carolina (two thirds of amount
debt has been reduced in previous biennium), and Wyoming (amount of tax revenue for
the current year).
17. Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Louisiana, Michigan,
(Vol. 68: 234
93 PUBLIC BUILDING AUTHORITIES
consequence (unless for extraordinary purposes such as defense against in-
surrection or invasion) must be authorized by a constitutional amendment. Ad-
ditionally, in nearly every jurisdiction the state constitution limits the debts of
counties and municipalities to a percentage of the value of taxable property with-
in their bounds.18
All of these restrictions have their origins in the financial debacles of the
previous century. Following the panic of 1837, the states which had been
embarrassed by heavy indebtedness adopted constitutional debt limits. Subse-
quently, new states, upon entering the union, imitated their predecessors.19
Because the resultant widespread debt limits later precluded state participation
in the railroad boom of the mid-nineteenth century, railway expansion was
largely financed by municipalities. A given municipality would either guarantee
railroad obligations in order to increase their marketability, or purchase rail-
road stock with the proceeds from a sale of municipal bonds. Consequently,
when the panic of 1873 found the municipalities overextended, the states re-
sponded with municipal debt limits, which soon became commonplace con-
stitutional provisions.
20
Nonetheless, many towns, especially those in prairie states, continued to
regard borrowed capital as indispensable for financing public utilities, schools
and roads. Devices were therefore conceived in order to avoid the recent
constitutional amendments. Three of these devices, developed long before the
evolution of public authorities and permitting evasion in non-authority contexts,
are important in the law of building authorities.
Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota,
Texas, Utah, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
18. The percentages differ, however. Most debt limits do not exceed 10%. None
surpass the 18% permitted in Virginia. See VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 127. Some states
provide different limits for various municipalities, see, e.g., PA. CONST. art. IX, § 8 (7%
generally, but 13Y% for Philadelphia), and some permit additional indebtedness for
local utilities, see, e.g., ALA. CoxsT. art. XII, § 225 (additional 3%); WASH. CoNrsT.
art. VIII, § 6 (5%). The Oklahoma constitution recently was amended to authorize
additional indebtedness for school buildings. OXC.A. CONsT. art. X, § 26. Some states
provide two limits. Municipal governments may not exceed the lower one unless em-
powered by a referendum. See, e.g., PA. CONST. art. IX, § 8 (voter approval required for
all debts above 2% generally, 3% for Philadelphia) ; '""AsH. CoNsT. art. VIII, § 6 (three-
fifths voter approval required for all debts over 1y2%).
Although Idaho generally limits municipal debts to an amount equivalent to current
municipal income, the electorate, by a two-thirds vote, may authorize indebtedness of any
amount. IDAHO CONsT. art. VIII, § 3. See also Ky. Co NsT. § 157. Oklahoma coordinates the
current income and the percentage of assessed property limits and allows the government
to incur indebtedness not in excess of current annual revenues, yet permits additional
indebtedness, up to a total of 5% of the assessed valuation, upon referendum. OKLA.
CONsT. art X, § 26.
Some state constitutions impose no municipal debt limit; instead statutes assume this
function. Stason, State Administrative Supervision of Mmicipal Indebtedness, 30 MIcH.
L. REV. 833, 838 n.7 (1932).
19. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMNTS, op. cit. supra note 3, at 11-12.
20. Williams & Nehemkis, Municipal Improvements as Affected by Constitutional
Debt Limitations, 37 CoLum. L. REv. 177-79 -(1937).
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Executory Contracts. On the theory that debt limits require the government
to exist on a pay-as-you-go but not a cash-on-the-barrel-head basis, government
obligations upon executory contracts for current expenses have been held not
to be debts within the meaning of the state constitutions. For example, salary
commitments to government employees for the current year are deemed not
to be debts, so long as the government's budget-including the salary accounts
-is balanced, even though the government is contractually bound. If, however,
the salaries cannot be paid from estimated revenues, the executory salary obli-
gations create a debt. Thus, to be exempt from debt restriction, the obliga-
tion must involve a current expense (salaries, supplies, services or rents), be
charged to a valid appropriation, and must not exceed estimated current revenue.
Some jurisdictions permit an important extension of this rule to include multi-
year executory contracts, so that a contract for hire for five years will not
create a debt if the salary is within estimated revenues. Capital acquisitions,
however, are not "current expenses" and therefore not within the executory
contract exception. 21
Special Districts. When a municipality has exhausted its permissible debt,
new projects can be financed by adding a new government unit, such as a special
park, water, or drainage district. Even if the district and the municipality are
co-extensive, the special district constitutes a separate corporation whose debt
is unrelated to that of the municipality.22 In any event, debt limits are often
construed as inapplicable to special districts, although districts have many
characteristics, including the power to tax, in common with municipalities.
Even if the debt limit is construed to restrict a special district, the debt po-
tential of an area doubles when a district is superimposed upon a municipality.
Special Funds. Finally, obligations payable from a "special fund" are not
considered debts within the meaning of the constitutional limits. 23 This ex-
ception was originally employed to permit the financing of local improvements,
such as paved streets, through assessments which were levied upon the bene-
fitted, abutting land and which, conceptually at least, were paid into a special
fund. The courts later extended the exception to encompass revenue bonds
financing public utilities and payable from utility receipts. The judicial theory
was that the government which issues these bonds acts solely as an agent for
collecting money to be applied against them, and that the owners of assessed
property and the utility rate-payers are the actual debtors.24 In distinct con-
21. Hoyt & Fordham, Constitutional Restrictions Upon Public Debt in North Carolina,
16 N.C.L. REv. 329, 343-45 (1938).
22. Williams & Nehemkis, supra note 20, at 201-06; Hoyt & Fordham, supra note 21,
at 356; BOLLENS, SPECIAL DIsTRicr GOVERNMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES, pp. 7-9
(1957).
23. Williams & Nehemkis, supra note 20, at 187-88; 15 McQuILLN, MUNICIPAL COR-
PORATIONS § 41.32 (3d ed. 1950).
24. "[T]here is no liability against the city. The special fund provided for and the
[benefited] property are the sources from which the holders of the bonds and certificates
must receive their pay, the city authorities acting merely as an agency for making and
collecting the assessments, and as the custodian of the fund when the assessments are
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trast with the special-district device-which reduplicates the corporate structure
of local government-the special-fund theory pierces the corporate veil and
construes the debt as an obligation of the ultimate payers.
Two important qualifications of the special-fund theory reduce its utility for
public authorities. If the government obligates itself to "feed" the fund-to
supplement it with tax receipts--constitutional debt limits apply,2 5 since the
government has gone beyond its role as a collection agent and has undertaken
partial payment of the debt. In addition, some jurisdictions have adopted the
"restricted" special-fund theory, which prohibits any mortgage securing reve-
nue bonds if it encumbers property formerly owned by the government free
and clear. Only purchase-money mortgages are permitted, the rationale being
that, if the mortgage encumbers pre-existing property, the threat of fore-
closure and consequent loss of that property may coerce the government into
redeeming the property by paying the debt from general government funds.
2 6
PUBLIC AUTHORITIES AND DEBT LIMITS BEFORE THE COURTS
Both the special-district and special-fund theories have relieved operating
authorities from constitutional debt limits. The first public authority, the
Kennebec Water District, was upheld on a special-district theory.27 Incorpo-
rated in 1899 to supersede privately owned water systems in and around Water-
ville, Maine, to pay the costs of acquisition with borrowed money, and to service
its debt with revenue from the systems, Kennebec was a typical special district
(except that it lacked the power to tax). Although the city of Waterville had
nearly exhausted its constitutional borrowing power, the Supreme Judicial
Court of Maine held the district's debt legitimate by finding the constitutional
collected. In this they do not act as the agents of the city, but as special agents, to ac-
complish a public end." Quill v. City of Indianapolis, 124 Ind. 292, 298, 23 N.E. 788, 790
(1890).
25. Williams & Nehemkis, supra note 20, at 198-200.
26. This rule was first adopted in City of Joliet v. Alexander, 194 Ill. 457, 62 N.E.
861 (1902). Since investors in government obligations often do not demand a mortgage,
the restriction as to security does not prove overly burdensome. The rule included a more
binding restriction which prohibited the pledge of prior income to the payment of revenue
bonds. If the facility to be improved had been operating at a profit, and that profit had
previously been paid into the government's general fund, any pledge of that income would
be unconstitutional because the taxpayers would have to pay increased taxes to replace
the revenue which the pledge diverted from the general fund to the payment of the bonds.
This restriction effectively prohibited revenue bond financing of utility improvements
unless revenues derived from the improvements could be segregated. Illinois, therefore,
rejected this branch of the restricted special-fund theory in Ward v. City of Chicago, 342
Ill. 167, 173 N.E. 810 (1930). Missouri, which adopted the restricted theory in Bell v.
City of Fayette, 325 Mo. 75, 28 S.W.2d 356 (1930), rejected it in Grossman v. Public
Water Supply Dist. No. 1, 339 Mo. 344, 96 S.W.2d 701 (1936). However, the restricted
special-fund theory still has vitality in a few states. Hesse v. City of Watertown, 57
S.D. 325, 232 N.W. 53 (1930) ; Fjeldsted v. Ogden City, 83 Utah 278, 28 P.2d 144 (1933).
And Wisconsin has adopted the restriction against mortgages. State ex rel. Morgan v.
City of Portage, 174 Wis. 588, 184 N.W. 376 (1921). See Williams & Nehemkis, supra
note 20, at 192-97, 209-11.
27. Kennebec Water Dist. v. City of Waterville, 96 Me. 234, 52 Atl. 774 (1902).
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limitation inapplicable to special districts, and by refusing to impute the dis-
trict's debts to the city. The court took the view that, as a separate corporate
entity, the district could incur obligations which were not city debts. Though
the opinion rested on the special-district theory, the special-fund theory would
have been equally appropriate, because water revenues are clearly special funds.
Not only do the terms of a typical special-fund obligation make the issuer liable
only for amounts in or owed the fund itself, but also the Kennebec Water
District's bonds-even if they were in form unconditional promises to pay-
would be special-fund obligations, for the district had only special-fund income.
The cases illustrate, however, that the special-district and special-fund ex-
ceptions to the debt limit cannot be utilized by a building authority save in ex-
ceptional situations. In Reynolds v. City of Waterville,28 for example, the same
court which, four years later, was to uphold the first operating authority in
the Kennebec case, invalidated a building authority. Reasoning with a per-
ception unusual in an initial review of a novel device, the court held that the
'Waterville New City Hall Building Commission, though a separate corporate
body, was merely a trustee under a deed of trust in the nature of a mortgage,
and that its bonds therefore constituted debts of the city in excess of the legal
limit.
Actually, the documents in question-typical of those usually found in
building authority cases- did not purport to create a mortgage. After a special
act of the legislature had incorporated a commission to build a city hall, the
city conveyed a lot to the commission, which then hired a building contractor
to erect the hall on this land. The commission planned to issue its bonds to
pay the contractor, and the city expected to rent the hall from the commission
at a rate sufficient to pay interest and retire the bonds. Nevertheless, the
Reynolds court, having reviewed these facts and endorsed the rule which ex-
empts multi-year executory contracts from a debt limitation,2 9 went on to find
that the City of Waterville was not merely contracting to hire the hall's use.
It would not be a misinterpretation to say that the city of Waterville,
instead of leasing the property, undertakes to purchase or pay for it on
the installment plan, and that what are called rentals for the hall are
merely partial payments on its cost.... [T] he true nature of the transac-
tion is rather the hiring of money by the city upon the security of city
property through the intervention of a trustee, the title to the property
being and remaining in the city from the beginning to the end, subject only
to the lien upon it in favor of -bondholders for money to be lent.30
Such an arrangement, said- the court,•is but a form of mortgage and hence the
bonds were debts of the city-mbirtgagor vi6lating the :debt limitation in the
Maine constitftiofi.3
28. 92 Me. 292, 42 AtI. 553 (1898).
29. The court stated: "[Omn this principal, a town or a city may contract for the use
of a hall for a term of years . .. " Id. at 303, 42 Atl. at 555.
30. Id. at 304, 42 Atl. at 555.
31. Language of trust in the city's deed of the lot to the commission aided the court
in this interpretation. The commission was granted the land in trust for building authority
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The court's reasoning is not without its logical appeal, since building
authorities and mortgage trustees have many common characteristics. Both
are jural personalities separate from the lenders and the ultimate enjoyer of the
res, and both have duties which spring from documents purporting to give
them title to the res. Neither, however, has a proprietary interest in the
property nor a proprietor's right to its possession. Like the typical trustee
under a corporate bond indenture, the building authority, although the primary
recipient of payments from the ultimate user, acts only as a conduit of funds
between the user and the bondholders.
3 2
Both the trust deed and the building authority device contain a defeasance
which, in the former, is usually explicit. In many building authority instru-
ments the defeasance is likewise explicit, and provides that title to the project
will pass to the occupying government when the authority's bonds are retired.33
purposes as spelled out in the commission's charter. Modern building authority documents
rarely contain words of trust. However, this terminology should not be considered
essential to the Reynolds court's theory. Presumably all corporate bodies take property
merely to further the execution of their corporate purposes.
32. The authority may even abdicate its function as a conduit if the lender and the
using agency so agree. For example, in connection with construction of an indoor athletic
practice building for the University of Wisconsin, the authority assigned its rentals to
the lending banks, and the Regents of the University agreed to pay rent directly to the
banks. State ex rel. Thomson v. Giessel, 271 Wis. 15, 72 N.W.2d 577 (1955).
33. The defeasance may be found in one of several documents: the enabling act, the
articles of incorporation, the lease from the authority to the government or in some other
agreement between authority and government.
The 1aine School Building Authority and the Texas National Guard Armory Board
are required by statute to convey projects to their lessees upon retirement of the debt
incurred in acquiring those projects. -M. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 41, § 254 (Supp. 1957) ;
TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5890b, § 3 (1949). Although the Georgia State Bridge
Building Authority Act does not require that title to the project be transferred, all the
benefits and burdens of ownership do pass to the state.
When each and all of the bonds . . . for the payment of which the revenues of any
given project or projects have been pledged, . . . have been paid in full, or a suf-
ficient amount for the payment of all such bonds . . . shall have been set aside in
trust for the benefit of such bondholders . . . such project or projects shall thence-
forth be maintained as a part of the State highway system, free from any and all
rental consideration: Provided that the State Highway Department shall maintain
and keep in repair such free project or projects.
GA. CoDE ANN. § 95-2310 (Supp. 1955).
The Michigan County Building Authority Act permits the governments which incor-
porate the authority to provide for conveyance, in the articles of incorporation.* MIcH.
STAT. ANN. § 5.301 (13) (Supp, 1957). PPursuant to this act, §. 6 of the articles of in-
corporation of the Detroit-Wayne Joint Building Authority specifies that, upon retirement
of the bonds, the building will be conveyed to the city and county in accordance with an
agreement between them. Walinske v. Detroit-Wayne Joint Bldg. Authority, 325 Mich.
562, 572, 39 N.W.2d 73, 76-77 (1949).
Indiana school building authorities must give their lessees an option to buy at any
time after six years, the price being sufficient to discharge the authority's obligations. IND.
STAT. ANN. § 28-3222 (Supp. 1955). Since the rent amortizes the authority's obligations,
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Even when no such express provision exists, the arrangement itself implies a
defeasance. The authority is obligated only to the leasing government and the
lenders, and, once the bonds are retired, its obligation runs to the government
alone. The authority has no further use for the project.34 Its directors can be
expected to convey the project to the government, for they are either appointed
by the leasing government or are officers of that government serving as directors
ex officio. In the unlikely event that they should fail to convey the project,
no contractual obligation would prevent the state from dissolving the corpora-
tion and thus causing all of its assets to pass to the state.35 In sum, the build-
ing authority device resembles a deed-of-trust variant of the deed absolute with
a separate defeasance-for the political position of the authority's directors
and the fact that the rents are sufficient to amortize its debt create a defeasance
where none is expressly provided.
36
the option price will steadily decrease until, upon retirement of all obligations, it will be
nil. The Indiana County Building Authorities Act permits options but does not set the
option price. IND. STAT. ANN. 26-2513 (Supp. 1955).
Some authorities build projects upon land owned by the lessee government. The govern-
ment first grants the authority a leasehold for a term of years at a nominal rent or free
of rent. The authority then leases back the project at a rent sufficient to service and
amortize its debt. See State ex rel. Thomson v. Giessel, 271 Wis. 15, 72 N.W.2d 577
(1955). If the lease, the lease back, and the bonds are of the same duration, the govern-
ment's reversion is functionally equivalent to a defeasance. In State ex rel. Thomson v.
Giessel, 267 Wis. 331, 65 N.W.2d 529 (1954) (plan held unconstitutional on grounds
irrelevant to this footnote), the term of the government's lease to the authority was fifty
years or until the indebtedness of the authority be paid and retired, whichever first occurs,
thus giving the government a right of entry in the nature of a defeasance.
34. It is significant that the bonds shall mature in thirty years and that the leases
shall run thirty years. There is no provision . . . for re-leasing. When a series
of buildings will have been leased for thirty years and the principal and interest
of the bonds sold to finance their construction will have been paid in full, the
authority's responsibility for, and interest in, that particular project, will have been
completed. The authority is not in business to make money.
State ex rel. Washington State Bldg. Financing Auhority v. Yelle, 47 Wash. 2d 705,
713, 289 P.2d 355, 360 (1955).
35. McCutcheon v. State Bldg. Authority, 13 N.J. 46, 59, 97 A.2d 663, 669 (1953).
36. See McCutcheon v. State Bldg. Authority, supra note 35; State c.r rel. Wash-
ington State Bldg. Financing Authority v. Yelle, 47 Wash. 2d 705, 289 P.2d 355 (1955).
But see Kelley v. Earle, 325 Pa. 337, 190 Atl. 140 (1937) (prior decision that building au-
thority was unconstitutional reversed upon new facts including removal of a lease covenant
requiring that the authority convey the project upon retirement of its bonds) ; State ex rel.
Thomson v. Giessel, 271 Wis. 15, 37, 39, 72 N.W.2d 577, 588, 589 (1955) ("There cannot
be a purchase without the passing of title. There is no passing of title in any of these trans-
actions .... Title to the property does not pass by virtue of the payment of the rentals.").
Though all building authorities imply a defeasance, some operating authorities are
not expected to convey projects to traditional units of government when the authorities'
debts are paid. In some instances, the authority must continue to hold the project since
it is the only organization in the area with bi-state jurisdiction. In contrast, other inter-
state authorities, such as the federally chartered interstate bridge authorities, see note
8 supra, are expected to convey their bridges to the adjacent states or municipalities.
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In the absence of an express defeasance clause, however, doctrinal techni-
calities make difficult an implication of conditional terms necessary to render
the transaction a mortgage. A deed absolute without a defeasance is construed
as a mortgage only upon a finding that the parties intended it to secure the
grantor's debt.37 And, in a narrow sense, the parties to a building authority
transaction did not so intend, since such a debt would be unconstitutional, and
the authority structure was designed to circumvent constitutional prohibitions.
Of course, in the usual deed-absolute case, the fact that the grantee denies the
existence of a debt will not prevent the courts from presuming a debt to be
present if the consideration for the deed is disproportionate to the value of
the property.3 8 But the application of this reasoning is apparently forestalled
by the ingenuity of the authority device, which admits the existence of a debt
but states that it is owed by the authority rather than the government.
Nonetheless, even if the parties' intent be accepted in the narrow sense sug-
gested, it need not be determinative. In mortgage law, courts often subordinate
the parties' intent to equitable considerations.3 9 If, for example, a borrower
does not demand an explicit defeasance, the courts assume that, by virtue of
his unequal bargaining power, he was forced into an unconscionable bargain.
To protect him, an equity court reconstructs his contract, and, upon finding a
mortgage at the bottom of the bargain, ignores the unconditional grant in the
documents, though the borrower intentionally may have agreed to this clogging
of the equity of redemption.
Although governments usually are not considered weak bargainers, the con-
stitutional debt limit is based upon the premise that, in matters of finance, they
are often imprudent. A legislature or municipality, caught between the popular
pressures for new developments and against additional taxes, may attempt
to escape through excessive borrowing. Not unlike equity's solicitude for
the mortgagor, debt limits reflect a determination by the framers and ratifiers
of state constitutions that governments are congenital borrowers who often
deal unwisely.
Since a government's weakness is not that it agrees to harsh terms of security
but rather that it accepts too many loans, building authority cases come before
the courts in an unusual posture.40 The usual deed-absolute case involves a
37. 1 GLENN, 'MORTGAGES § 11 (1943).
38. See 4 Po0ma-oy, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1196, at 583-85 (5th ed. 1941).
39. The entire history of mortgages illustrates equity's unwillingness to enforce
the literal terms of mortgage documents, despite the fact that, at one time, these documents
may have reported accurately the intent of the parties. Thus, the mortgagee's title has
been reduced from a proprietary interest to a security interest, and evasive devices have
been reshaped into equitable mortgages-all in aid of the borrower.
40. The difference in context may significantly affect the attitude of the parties and
the judges' response. Unlike most cases, in which plaintiff and defendant are engaged
in a dispute of personal consequence, building authority controversies are usually brought
to probe judicial reaction to a novel plan. The investment community demands test cases
of this sort; a mere bond opinion by reputable counsel does not invariably suffice. Thus,
the Allstate Insurance Company conditioned its agreement to purchase an entire issue
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borrower seeking to redeem, although he had previously agreed to accept
strict foreclosure at the due date. Thus, to reach an equitable result, a debt
must be found from which a mortgage can be deduced. In contrast, the Rey-
nolds court found a mortgage from which it deduced a debt. The same realistic
of authority bonds upon a decision by the state supreme court that "all transactions with
reference to the acquisition, construction, and financing of the state-office-building project,
including the provisions of this commitment, the statutes underlying such transactions
and the security to be given securing the loan to be made to the [Authority] Corporation
are valid, subsisting, and enforceable in the hands of Allstate." State ex reL Thomson
v. Giessel, 267 Wis. 331, 337, 65 N.W.2d 529, 532 (1954).
Since a specific lender cannot make such a demand in a public offering of the authority
bonds, the officials involved often attempt to manufacture a cause of action to obtain a
judgment which will sweeten the market. The Governor of Maine, in propounding qucs-
tions concerning the faine School Building Authority to the supreme court, prefaced his
questions with "Whereas, the Authority is unable to issue its revenue bonds unless
prior thereto said questions of law have been resolved . . ." Opinion of the Justices, 147
Me. 410, 411, 105 A.2d 454-55 (1952). That court refused to render an advisory opinion,
but upon other occasions the advisory opinion device has been successfully employed.
E.g., Opinion of the Justices, 88 N.H. 484, 190 Atl. 425 (1937). Most states have not
established a general advisory opinion procedure. To remedy this, the Oklahoma turnpike
authority acts authorize the state supreme court to render declaratory judgments in con-
nection with the authorities. Unless interested individuals appear to protest, the action
is conducted in ex parte form. 69 Oa.A. STAT. ANN. § 663 (1950). In the first such action,
many protestants entered. Application of Oklahoma Turnpike Authority, 203 Okla. 335, 221
P.2d 795 (1950). A subsequent test case was ex parte. Applications of Oklahoma Turn-
pike Authority, 277 P.2d 176 (Okla. 1954).
The quo warranto procedure is also available to test the constitutionality of an author-
ity's enabling act and plan of business. Though quo warranto has been utilized, People ex
rel. Greening v. Green, 382 Ill. 577, 47 N.E.2d 465 (1943), it appears to occur less fre-
quently than cases which arise on patently sham issues. For example, the Washington
Supreme Court held a state building authority unconstitutional in an action of mandamus
to compel the state auditor to issue a warrant for ten dollars compensation to a stenographer
employed by the authority. State ex reL Washington State Bldg. Financing Authority v.
Yelle, 47 Wash. 2d 705, 289 P.2d 355 (1955). The Wisconsin Turnpike Commission was
upheld in a dispute over a voucher for a $155 typewriter. State ex reL Thomson v. Giessel,
265 Wis. 185, 60 N.W.2d 873 (1953). In Ohio, the Secretary of State refused to attest
bonds of the Public Institutional Building Authority and thereby enabled the court to
rule on the constitutional question in an action of mandamus against him. State ex reL
Public Institutional Bldg. Authority v. Griffith, 135 Ohio St. 604, 22 N.E.2d 200 (1939).
Some cases are taxpayers' suits. Although the reports usually do not indicate the tax-
payers' motive for suing, one court suggested that the taxpayer did not resemble the
usual adversary party and observed that his contentions of unconstitutionality "are some-
what sketchily supported by argument and citations in the brief, and counsel for plaintiff
made no oral argument. Perhaps, as sometimes happens in 'friendly suits,' his function
in this case is similar to that of the 'devil's advocate' at the canonization of a saint."
Wells v. Housing Authority, 213 N.C. 744, 747, 197 S.E. 693, 695 (1938).
Frequently, courts predisposed to uphold the authority device also willingly extend the
scope of their opinions so that their opinion will help promote the sale of the authority's
bonds. In Monarch Mining Co. v. State Highway Comm'n, 128 Mont. 65, 270 P.2d 738
(1954), although the court held only that the plaintiff taxpayer lacked standing to sue,
since he would not be adversely affected, the court added that the bonds would not violate
the state constitutional debt limit. In State ex rel. Thomson v. Giessel, supra, the court
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approach, however, which permits courts to cut through form to substance in
the deed-absolute cases, also can justifiably be applied in this area to discover
a mortgage debt disguised as a contract for rent.
Even if, by their terms, the doctrines supporting equitable mortgages are
not applicable to all building authorities, they are close enough to warrant an
extension by analogy. Despite the separate corporate personality given the
authority by the legislature, the trust deed furnishes ample precedent for con-
struing a building authority as a mere contractual device. The existence of a
separate jural personality, though apparently sufficient to avoid the debt limit
in the Kennebec case, need not be conclusive. The Kennebec operating author-
ity's corporate personality had a functional counterpart: a business enterprise
with a separate commercial income. Reynolds, on the other hand, involved a
building authority which lacked such an enterprise and simply policed the
contractual rights of the city, the lenders and the building contractor. Just as
the law of mortgages, in construing the relationship of the parties to a transac-
tion, reduces a live trustee to a contrivance, so also should the law recognize
a corporate building authority-admittedly a creation of the law, without a
functional counterpart-as a similar artifice.
The Reynolds case is unique in its reasoning. Many later decisions have also
held building authorities unconstitutional, but none has used the mortgage-
deed-of-trust analogy. Even the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, while re-
cently citing Reynolds with approval, sought another ground for declaring a
proposed state building authority unconstitutional and based its opinion upon
the identity of rent payments with the cost of financing the project. From this
identity, it reasoned that the plan was an installment purchase-a device long
recognized as unconstitutional. 41 Other courts have argued that, if a scheme
merely channels government funds to the payment of bonds, the bonds are
government debts;42 and that the interposition of an authority's corporate
faced the question whether a commission formed to study the feasibility of a turnpike
could buy a typewriter. Statutes provided that with the Governor's concurrence, this
planning commission could proceed to form an authority to build a turnpike, if it found
the turnpike feasible. While ruling that the planning commission could buy a typewriter,
the court added that, if the commission did find a turnpike feasible and if an authority
were subsequently formed, the bonds of the authority, its power of eminent domain, its
tax exemptions and its power to establish roadside concessions would be constitutional.
In Walinske v. Detroit-Wayne Joint Bldg. Authority, 325 Mich. 562, 39 N.W.2d 73
(1949), although the supreme court upheld the court below in deciding that the authority
device was constitutional, the superior court disagreed with the procedure of summary
dismissal and ordered that a decree be entered. A summary dismissal, needless to say,
would not be influential in financial circles as would a decree supported by an opinion
which held the authority constitutional.
41. Opinion of the Justices, 146 Me. 183, 79 A.2d 753 (1951) ; accord, McCutcheon
v. State Bldg. Authority, 13 N.J. 46, 97 A.2d 663 (1953) ; State ex rel. Washington State
Bldg. Financing Authority v. Yelle, 47 Wash. 2d 705, 289 P.2d 355 (1955).
42. State v. Volusia County School Bldg. Authority, 60 So. 2d 761 (Fla. 1952);
Hively v. School City of Nappanee, 202 Ind. 28, 169 N.E. 51 (1929) ; State ex rel. Public
Institutional Bldg. Authority v. Griffith, 135 Ohio St. 604, 22 N.E.2d 200 (1939).
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entity does not alter the essential character of the transaction. 43  Both this
and the recent Maine approaches are eminently realistic. Nevertheless, by
accepting the corporate form of the authority but finding it merely a part of a
credit device, the Reynolds case shows greater insight. Furthermore, by con-
struing the authority as a mortgage trustee, the Reynolds rationale emphasizes
the authority's duties to the bondholders, a matter of considerable importance.
BUILDING AUTHORITIES As LESSORS
Once courts decide to honor the integrity of the building authority device.
they proceed readily to the conclusion that the authority's bonds, being non-
governmental, do not violate constitutional debt limitations. By analogy to
special districts, these obligations of the corporate authorities are not, them-
selves, debts of any traditional unit of government. Authorities' leases, how-
ever, are disposed of with less facility, for a lease executed by a lessee-govern-
ment and an independent lessor-authority would appear to evidence a govern-
mental debt subject to constitutional restriction. Nonetheless, three arguments
have been advanced to exempt rent obligations from any limitation. These
arguments are bottomed on the special-fund theory, the executory-contract ex-
43. "If the acts proposed to be done in financing the enterprise are valid, then such
acts do not require conferring the status of a corporation upon the agency, though it
might be of practical convenience and value to do so.... ." State Office Bldg. Comm'n v.
Trujillo, 46 N.M. 29, 39, 120 P.2d 434, 440 (1941).
Judge Critz, dissenting in Texas Nat'l Guard Armory Bd. v. McCraw, 132 Tex. 613,
635, 126 S.W.2d 627, 640 (1939), declared:
To my mind this Act, in so far as it authorizes rental or lease contracts with the
State, and long-term bonds of the Board based thereon, presents a legal impossibility,
and a legal paradox.... Under such a law, while the Board holds the legal title,
such title holding is a pure fiction. The real title is in the State from the beginning.
Thus we have one agency of the State taking -the State's own property and leasing
it to the State, for a stipulated rental to be paid by the State, and bonds issued
on such rental. I cannot agree that such a scheme is possible. One cannot rent his
own property to himself.
Conversely, in State v. Florida State Improvement Comm'n, 160 Fla. 230, 34 So. 2d 443
(1948), the theory that interposition of a building authority would not change the char-
acter of the transaction enabled the court to hold a plan constitutional. Article IX, § 16
of the Florida constitution imposes a special gasoline tax, the proceeds of which must be
used for "the construction or reconstruction of State Roads" and the "lease or purchase
of bridges." The Florida State Improvement Commission planned to build a highway,
use the State Road Department as its prime contractor, and to lease the highway to
the State Road Department which then would pay the rents from the constitutional
gasoline tax fund. The court first held that the debt limit did not apply to the tax fund
obligations. But, it was argued, the constitution did not permit the use of this fund for
highway rentals. Only bridges could be leased with this money. In connection with roads, the
fund must be used solely for road construction or reconstruction, not rental. The court
answered that "it cannot be said that the State Road Department is not lawfully 'con-
structing' the road within the contemplation of the Constitution. This being the situation,
it is our view that the payment of interest on the bond proceeds is merely a legal and
necessary incident to that venture." Id. at 245, 34 So. 2d at 451.
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ception, and the proposition that future rents are not debts as a matter of
common law.
The Special-Fund Theory
The special-fund theory is rarely applicable to building authorities, since
the lessee-government usually pays the rents from its general funds. Special
assessments or grants-in-aid finance some government activities, however, and,
arguably, the special-fund theory validates rent obligations payable from these
sources.
Some exceptional cases clearly involve a special fund. For example, the
Florida State Improvement Commission financed the Lower Tampa Bay
Bridge and then leased the bridge to the state, which charged bridge tolls to meet
the rent obligation.44 Thus, though sponsored by a formal building authority,
the project receives commercial income which creates a special fund to amor-
tize the debt. Although the state could have financed the bridge by its own
issue of revenue bonds, the interposition of an authority does not make the
special-fund theory inapplicable.
In other cases, involving authorities created to construct new office
buildings for state agencies, the existence of a special fund is not so obvious.
The fund theory is put forward, however, when the buildings are rented to
financially autonomous agencies, such as those which administer unemployment
compensation and are supported by federal grants, 45 or those which handle
workmen's compensation and defray their costs through special assessments
on compensation insurers.46 Two cases have used the special-fund rationale
to permit building authorities to receive rents from such agencies. 47 Though
on a purely verbal level the special-fund theory may be applicable to this
practice, this use of the theory does not appear legitimate. The lessee-agencies
are part of the machinery of government and are financially independent by
historical accident alone. Unlike a sewerage system, a toll bridge or an airport,
they receive no commercial income from their customers. Rather they reallo-
cate wealth in implementing a social policy to which government is committed.
Admittedly, however, the distinction between commercial and noncommercial
government income is not always self-evident, witness the difficulty the courts
have had with the distinction between proprietary and governmental activities
in construing the extent of municipal immunity from suit.
The two foregoing cases present further complications, for in each instance
44. State v. Florida State Improvement Comm'n, 52 So. 2d (Fla. 1951).
45. 49 Stat. 626 (1935), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 502 (1952).
46. DODD, ADMINISTRATION OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 807 (1936).
47. McArthur v. Smallwood, 225 Ark. 328, 281 S.W.2d 428 (1955); State v. Florida
State Improvement Comm'n, 158 Fla. 743, 30 So. 2d 97 (1947). The West Virginia State
Office Building Commission adopted the same plan and leased its building to the State
Department of Employment, the Merit Council and the Workmen's Compensation Fund.
COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, PUBLIc AUTHORITIES IN THE STATES 99 (1953). Appar-
ently the West Virginia program has not been tested in the courts.
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the building has several tenants. The Florida Industrial (workmen's compensa-
tion) Commission, for instance, rents an entire building from an authority, but
sublets portions of it to other state agencies. Although the state's general
funds support the other agencies, the court held this leasing arrangement un-
restricted by the constitutional debt limit. Actually, receipt of payments from
the sublessees by the Industrial Commission's treasury should cause the
treasury to lose its special-fund status, since the state would be feeding the
fund with tax receipts. But the court skirted this point.48 Similarly, the
Arkansas court approved a plan for a building to be occupied by the work-
men's compensation commission, the public service commission, the attorney
general, and the supreme court, its clerk and library.49 The workmen's com-
pensation commission was to pay the rent for its space from its own treasury,
which was characterized as a special fund. Although the public service com-
mission had to meet its administrative expenses with state-appropriated revenues,
these funds were replaced in the state treasury by periodic assessments upon
all public carriers and utilities within the commission's jurisdiction. The
court held these funds to be a conceptually discrete portion of the general state
revenues, and held that portion to be the source of the commission's appropri-
ations.50 Likewise, the rents for the court and the attorney general's office
48. "Appellant tacitly admits that . . . [three cases] conclude the point of whether
or not sums received in consideration for sub rental for office space not used by the Florida
Industrial Commission . . . may be used to service the revenue certificates brought in
question, since no assault is made on the use of the funds derived from these sources."
State v. Florida State Improvement Comm'n, 158 Fla. 743, 746, 30 So. 2d 97, 98 (1947).
The three cases do not conclude the issue, however, for none involves a fund-feeding plan.
See State ex rel. Watson v. Caldwell, 156 Fla. 618, 23 So. 2d 855 (1945) (State Improve-
ment Commission Act held constitutional; no specific plan and hence no specific source
of income considered); Hopkins v. Baldwin, 123 Fla. 649, 167 So. 677 (1936) (bonds
payable from student and faculty fees and payments upheld on a special-fund theory);
Brash v. State Tuberculosis Bd., 124 Fla. 652, 169 So. 218 (1936) (bonds payable from
revenues of sanatorium upheld on special-fund theory). Compare Brash v. State Tubercu-
losis Bd., 124 Fla. 167, 167 So. 827 (1936) (previous plan, which included a pledge of
the board's state-appropriated funds, held unauthorized by statute, the court expressing
doubt that any such plan could be constitutionally authorized).
49. McArthur v. Smallwood, 225 Ark. 328, 281 S.W.2d 428 (1955). Because the
project was to be occupied by the supreme court, the entire court disqualified itself.
The case was decided by a special supreme court appointed for the purpose.
50. Compare State ex ret. Public Institutional Bldg. Authority v. Giffith, 135 Ohio
St. 604, 22 N.E.2d 200 (1939), which held the Public Institutional Building Authority
unconstitutional. The court rejected the claim that the special-fund theory applied
inasmuch as rental payments for the hospital facilities the Authority planned to build
could be covered by fees the state received from pay-patients and contributions from
counties which sent indigent patients. "All such funds are first paid into the state
treasury and together with the necessary general revenues are appropriated for the use
of the department [of welfare] by the General Assembly.... The revenues . . . are not
segregated into a special fund but are treated as, and in fact become, revenues of the
state .... ." Id. at 615, 22 N.E.2d at 205.
A subsequent plan required that the payments were not to be commingled with general
state funds. In State ex rel. Public Institutional Bldg. Authority v. Neffner, 137 Ohio St.
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were deemed to be paid from the proceeds of additional costs charged litigants
before all courts in the state. In upholding this final aspect of the plan, the
court attenuated the special-fund theory beyond its breaking point since these
additional litigation costs are not exacted in any given year in which the
legislature appropriates rent for judicial and public-attorney office space. Fur-
thermore, the close institutional identification of the court system with the
government precludes treating the revenue from additional litigation costs as
a special fund. Certainly, courts are not commercial undertakings. In fact,
they levy the additional costs only if the legislature fails to pay their rent.
Court-imposed costs therefore form not a continuing fund for payment, but a
makeshift substitute when payment is not forthcoming from the state treasury.
Since the legislature has appropriated rent for the first year, there is no guaran-
tee that these additional court costs are politically acceptable. If they are not,
then the threat that they must be levied will coerce the legislature to make future
appropriations. Rather than a means for payment, these costs may become
sanctions in aid of payment from the state treasury.51
The Executory-Contract and Common-Law Theories
In contrast with the special-fund theory, which is inapplicable to building
authority rents absent facts peculiar to extraordinary situations, the two other
theories employed to exempt building authority leases from the debt limit are
not conditioned upon unusual considerations. If applicable to any building
authority, they are applicable to all. In Wisconsin, for example, rents are not
debts as a matter of common law.5 2 Adopting a different theory, Pennsylvania
390, 30 N.E.2d 705 (1940), the court decreed that this innovation would not cure the
defect because the funds which previously had defrayed medical expenses would no
longer be available for that purpose and the state would be obliged to replace the diverted
funds with tax receipts. The legislature might have predicted this result; the court
in Griffith, by its citations, implicitly had adopted the revenue qualification of the
restricted special-fund theory.
51. There are other instances of government payments to authorities in lieu of user
charges. The city of Norfolk, Va., pays the Elizabeth River Tunnel Commission approxi-
mately $400,000 a year in consideration for toll-free operation of a bridge. CouNcIL oF
STATE GovmzxmENTs, op. cit. supra note 47, app. A, at 8. The state of Alabama was
permitted to pay an annual sum to the Alabama State Bridge Corporation, which had
defaulted upon its bonds when its commercial income proved inadequate. Scott v. Alabama
State Bridge Corp., 233 Ala. 12, 169 So. 273 (1936). Both these schemes exist on a
year-to-year basis and thus involve no future contractual obligation by the paying govern-
ment. Although both schemes illustrate that political pressure may coerce payment from
state treasuries in order to discharge special-fund obligations and thereby relieve the
burden of user charges, most special-fund obligations are distinguishable from the Arkansas
Justice Building Plan. The fact that the Virginia and Alabama legislatures permitted
the charges to be levied in the first place evidences their political acceptability. In contrast,
the Arkansas legislature sidestepped the problem of political palatability by appropriating
funds in lieu of charges for the first year.
52. State cx rel. Thomson v. Giessel, 267 Wis. 331, 65 N.W.2d 529 (1954). An argu-
ment to this effect is presented in greater detail by the dissent in McCutcheon v. State
Bldg. Authority, 13 N.J. 46, 69-70, 97 A.2d 663, 675 (1953).
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and Indiana have permitted building authority leases under the multi-year
executory-contract exception to the debt limit,53 and Alabama has a one-year
executory-contract exception to debt limits.5
4
Both the common-law and executory-contract theories assume that the con-
tractual relationship between the authority and its lessee government can be
terminated with ease. The following paragraphs will attempt to demonstrate
that these theories do not justify the building authority device because leases
actually cannot be severed except under circumstances which would coerce a
government to pay overdue rent, and because, in practice, governments cannot
afford the disruption of function or the economic loss which would attend
termination.
The One-Year Executory-Contract Exception. In Alabama, where the multi-
year executory-contract exception has not been adopted, a building authority
lease was struck down as an unconstitutional debt. The court helpfully ob-
served:
"We are . . . dealing . . . with an unconditional obligation to pay money
whether it is available that [future] year or not. If the amount of the stipulated
monthly rental were to be payable only out of the current revenues to be
received for the fiscal year in which it is payable, a different principle would
apply." 5  The legislature took the hint and, the following year, enacted a plan
whereby the authority would lease its project on an annual basis, the rents under
each successive one-year lease to be paid from the lessee's current budget as
a current expense. The court subsequently approved this codification of its
own dictum, 56 apparently on the assumption that a failure to renew the lease
would relieve the government of its rent obligation.
53. Greenhalgh v. Woolworth, 361 Pa. 543, 64 A2d 659 (1949); Jefferson School
Twp. v. Jefferson Twp. School Bldg. Co., 212 Ind. 542, 10 N.E.2d 608 (1937); Protsman
v. Jefferson-Craig Consol. School Corp., 231 Ind. 527, 109 N.E.2d 889 (1953). The last
two cases effectively overrule Hively v. School City of Nappanee, 202 Ind. 28, 169 N.E.
51 (1929), see note 42 supra, though they purport to distinguish it.
Before the Greenhalgh case, Pennsylvania apparently had upheld building authoritie.
under a tortured extension of the special-fund theory. Kelley v. Earle, 325 Pa. 337, 190
Atl. 140 (1937). In Greenhalgh, the court characterized the special-fund language in
Kelley as dictum since the project was not revenue-producing.
54. In re Opinion of the Justices, 252 Ala. 465, 41 So. 2d 761 (1949).
55. Opinion of the Justices, 251 Ala. 91, 95, 36 So. 2d 475, 478 (1948).
56. In re Opinion of the Justices, 252 Ala. 465, 41 So. 2d 761 (1949). Some long term
leases incorporate a similar device. For instance, the enabling act for the Illinois State
Armory Board provides: "Such leases to the State shall be subject to appropriations to
be made by the General Assembly, for the payment of rent under such leases." It further
empowers the Board, "in the event of non-payment of rents reserved in such leases to
execute leases [of such projects] ... to others for any suitable purpose." ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 129, § 226(g) (Supp. 1957). This act was held constitutional since the state will not
be liable for nonpayment of rent if the legislature fails to appropriate sufficient funds.
Loomis v. Keehn, 400 Ill. 337, 80 N.E.2d 368 (1948). See also Wis. STAT. § 14.89(c)
(1955), upheld in State ex rel. Thomson v. Giessel, 271 Wis. 15, 72 N.W.2d 577 (1955)
Texas Nat'l Guard Armory Bd. v. McCraw, 132 Tex. 613, 126 S.W.2d 627 (1939).
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The Multiyear Executory-Contract Exception. Although severely criti-
cized," the rule exempting multiyear executory contracts has nevertheless re-
ceived considerable support. The United States Supreme Court invoked the
rule in a leading decision concerning a lease between a city and a privately
owned water company. The Court reasoned that an executory breach by the
lessor would excuse the city's performance.i s Other cases have based the rule
on the common practice of businessmen who, in calculating their solvency,
exclude their obligations upon executory contracts.5 9 These cases overlook
the fact that businessmen also omit from their calculations the future benefits
expected to accrue under such contracts-since the benefits would, presum-
ably, be balanced by the contractual liabilities. In any event, calculations of
solvency are irrelevant to the debt-limit issue. Borrowing usually has no
immediate effect upon solvency, because the money borrowed equals the debt
incurred. More important, balance-sheet accounting attempts to estimate an
instantaneous business position and, in so doing, assumes that all business
can stop, that executory contracts can be broken, and that, upon breach, the
parties can obtain satisfactory redress in the market place. 60 As will presently
appear, this assumption is misleading in the context of a government authority
lease.
57. 1 JoNEs, BONDS AND BOND SEcuiITIEs § 105 (4th ed. 1935).
58. There is a distinction between a debt and a contract for a future indebtedness
to be incurred, provided the contracting party perform the agreement out of which
the debt may arise. There is also a distinction between the latter case and one
where an absolute debt is created at once, as by the issue of railway bonds, or for
the erection of a public improvement, though such debt be payable in the future
by instalments. In the one case the indebtedness is not created until the consideration
has been furnished; in the other the debt is created at once, the time of payment being
only postponed.
In the case under consideration [a contract under which a water company would
supply the city water for twenty-five years, and the city pay $1,500 annually in
return] the annual rental did not become an indebtedness within the meaning of
the charter until the water appropriate to that year had been furnished. If the
company had failed to furnish it, the rental would not have been payable at all,
and while the original contract provided for the creation of an indebtedness, it was
only upon condition that the company performed its own obligation. Wood v.
Partridge, 11 Mass. 487, 493.
Walla Walla City v. Walla Walla Water Co., 172 U.S. 1, 20 (1898).
The Court then added a more cogent reason for the rule: that the opposing view would
effectively prevent the city from obtaining a water supply; it could neither borrow to build
its own system nor obtain a supply from a commercial company on a short term contract.
This argument, however, suggests the advisability of abolishing debt limits rather than
rescuing multiyear contracts from their ban.
59. See, e.g., City of Valparaiso v. Gardner, 97 Ind. 1 (1884).
60. In the event of a breach, the innocent party can only demand the difference be-
tween the market price and the contract price. Thus, in a static market his recovery
would be nil. This accounting practice, therefore, assumes a static market. That markets
are not static reveals the unreality of the accounting premise. This fallacy, however,
pervades balance sheet reckoning. For example, assets are usually carried at historical
cost less depreciation rather than at replacement value.
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The Common-Law Rule. The Wisconsin view-that future rents are not
debts as a matter of common law-derives from ancient precedents: the rule
is pronounced as a mystery of the common law inherited unchanged from
Coke's Littleton.61 However venerable its origins, the rule appears question-
able, for future rent has all the attributes of an immature debt that will
become actionable when due. In fact, the rule was possibly poor law even in
Lord Coke's day.62 At any rate, it certainly seems contrary to modern under-
standing.
The premise underlying the rule is that future rent will not become due if a
lease is terminated prematurely. Littleton contrasted the effect of a "release
of all actions" upon a bond with its effect upon a lease. If a creditor holding
an immature bond gives such a release, it will bar action upon the bond
when due, but if a lessor executes a release, it will not bar his subsequent
action for rent. In Coke's words, at the time of the release, the bond was
"debitum in praesenti, quamvis sit solvendum in futuro." Rent, however, was
"neither debitum nor solvendum at the time of the release made; for if the
land be evicted from the lessee before the rent become due, the rent is avoyded;
for it is to be paid out of the profits of the land, and it is a thing not meerely
in action, because it may be granted over. But the lessor before the day may
acquite or release the rent."' 3 Future rent, then, could be released, but a "release
of all actions" was formally the improper procedure.
61. 2 COKE, LITTLETON §§ 512, 513 (15th ed. 1794). "[T]he law as to leases is not a
matter of logic in vacuo; it is a matter of history that has not forgotten Lord Coke."
Holmes, J., in Gardiner v. William S. Butler & Co., 245 U.S. 603, 605 (1918) (holding that
a landlord's claims for loss of the benefit of his bargain when his tenant went into equity
receivership were not provable under the Massachusetts law of leaseholds).
See also 1 TIFFANY, LANDLORD AND TENANT § 166 (1912), which relies upon Coke
and early Massachusetts cases, particularly Bordman v. Osborn, 40 Mass. 295 (1839).
The Bordman case held that a stockholder who, by statute, was liable for the debts of
the company, was not liable for unpaid rent which became due after the stockholder had
transferred his stock to another, even though the lease had been executed before the
stock transfer.
This rule plagued bankruptcy administration until amendments of the bankruptcy act
solved the problem in the 1930's. 3 CoLLIER, BANKRUPTCY f 63.32 (14th ed. 1941). While
the bankruptcy courts generally refused proof of landlords' claims for future rents because,
as Lord Coke had said, they were not debts, the rule probably had vitality because land-
lords' claims were secured by the right of entry for nonpayment of rent, whereby the
land leased could be recovered. A claim for future rents too closely resembled a secured
creditor's claim for future interest. Since bankruptcy administration is primarily for the
benefit of unsecured creditors, omission of landlords' claims seemed consistent with the
purpose of the act.
For a history of the doctrine and an argument that it should not apply in present com-
mercial practices, see Radin, Claims for Unaccrued Rent in Bankruptcy, 21 CALIF. L. REV.
561, 22 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 2-5, 11-13 (1933).
62. Oldden v. Tonto Realty Corp., 143 F.2d 916, 922 (2d Cir. 1944) (dissent of
Frank, J.), and authorities there cited.
63. 2 COKE, LITTLETON §§ 512, 513 (15th ed. 1794).
[Vol. 68: 234
PUBLIC BUILDING AUTHORITIES
From Coke's language, early American cases in various contexts developed
a rule that rents were not debts.0 4 The decisions reasoned that contingencies
might excuse the payment of rent-that the tenant might be ousted by one
with title superior to that of his landlord, or that the term could be ended
prematurely by surrender or eviction.
Ouster by a superior title holder, whatever its former likelihood, is so
improbable in an age of recording acts as hardly to merit consideration. The
obligation to pay rent to a building authority is, however, generally contingent
upon the lessee's right to continuous possession, and a respectable body of
authority exempts contingent obligations from constitutional debt limits. The
cases are not in harmony, but one view requires the contingency to be within
the control of the obligated government. 65 Under that test the danger of ouster
would not save an otherwise unconstitutional obligation.
Eviction is merely the leasehold variant of the possibility of executory breach
of contract, regarded by the Supreme Court as a ground for exempting ex-
ecutory contracts. If a landlord declares an executory breach, the lessee may
terminate the lease with impunity. Surrender denominates much the same
transaction with the parties reversed; the tenant may terminate the lease if
the lessor concurs. Absent this concurrence, however, the tenant may not
conclude his obligation to pay rent by surrendering the leasehold.
The Basic Assumption. Thus, the Wisconsin common-law view, and the
Alabama (one-year) and Pennsylvania and Indiana (multiyear) rules ex-
empting executory contracts from the debt limit, are essentially similar. All
assume that the government's relation with the building authority can be
terminated before the authority's debts are fully paid and that no sanctions, the
threat of which would coerce the government into continuing the relationship,
will be imposed upon its termination. The methods of termination that are
envisaged differ. A series of annual leases, as permitted in Alabama, would
be terminated by either party's refusal to renew the lease. The multi-year
executory-contract exception contemplates the possibility that the authority
might evict the lessee-government. And the Wisconsin view presupposes the
possibility of surrender as well as eviction. The only important distinction
among these views is that, in Alabama, the relationship is formally terminable
64. Wood v. Partridge, 11 Mass. 487, 492 (1814). The early Massachusetts cases do
uot cite Coke, but they adopt his Latin phrases. The Wood case was the first to use
Coke's Latin in connection with rents. Earlier cases, however, applied the same phrases
to obligations conditioned upon a successful sea voyage or upon collection of a bill of
exchange. Wentworth v. Whittemore, 1 Mass. 471, 472 (1805) ; Davis v. Ham, 3 Mass.
33, 36 (1807) : Frothingham v. Haley, 3 Mass. 68, 70 (1807). See also the language in
Walla Walla City v. Walla Walla Water Co., 172 U.S. 1, 20 (1898), quoted supra note
58, citing the Wood case.
Bordman v. Osborn, 40 Mass. 295 (1839), supra note 61, relies upon both Coke and
the Wood case.
65. Hoyt & Fordham, Constitutional Restrictions Upon Public Debt in North Carolina,
16 N.C.L. REv. 329, 346 (1938).
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by the government over the authority's objection."0 The other theories premise
methods of termination which require the authority's assent.
This common assumption-that building authority leases are terminable-
is unsound. Not only are the parties bound to each other functionally, but the
lessee-government's financial interest in the leased project, an interest which
increases as its rent payments are used to amortize the debt, is hostage to
its continued participation in the plan until the entire debt is retired. Moreover,
in order to perform its own functions, the government must continue to lease
the authority-built facilities. Substitute projects of specialized design, like
schools and courthouses, are, obviously, often unavailable,6 7 and special require-
ments of physical location constrict the supply of others of more common
structure. For example, an office building at the commercial center of a city
is not equivalent to an authority's project on the statehouse grounds. Besides,
moving to an alternative location often costs prohibitively more than continued
occupancy of the authority's project, since by its exemption from property
and income taxes and the low interest on its tax-exempt bonds, an authority
is enabled to undersell commercial lessors despite the fact that its rents include
amortization costs. 68 Thus, lacking readily accessible and equivalent substitute
facilities, the government can abandon a building authority project only by
curtailing its functions-usually a legal or political impossibility.
Furthermore, building authorities are likewise unable to terminate a lease
arrangement. Since they have no use for profits, the rental payments under the
lease meet all their needs. Furthermore, the specialized design and location of
many projects precludes their profitable commercial usage. Even if occupancy
by a commercial lessee were feasible, it might jeopardize the tax-exempt status
of the authority's bonds and thus threaten a reduction of the bondholders' net
66. The Illinois State Armory Board device which permits the state to terminate
the lease with impunity should the legislature fail to appropriate the rent, note 56 supra,
similarly permits the state unilaterally to terminate the relationship.
67. Magnusson, Lease-Financing by Municipal Corporations as a Way Around Debt
Limitations, 25 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 377, 391-92 (1957). The author indicates that leases
of office space, maintenance yards, garages, armories and auditoriums may be terminable.
68. The cost of occupancy must include the expense of operation, maintenance and
insurance plus financial costs (interest, profit, and debt amortization). Should the
government abandon an authority's project and rent substitute facilities from a private
company, there probably would be little change in the operation, maintenance and insurance
expenses the rent would have to cover. However, the private company probably would be
subject to property taxes and would charge more than a 6% return on its investment.
Of course, an authority's costs, including amortization of the debt, vary with the maturity
of the bonds and the interest rate. At 2% for twenty years, the annual cost of interest
and amortization is 6.116% of the original debt. At 4Y% for thirty years, the annual
cost is 6.139%. At 5% for thirty-seven years, the annual cost is 5.984%. COUNCIL OF
STATE GOVERNMENTS, PUTBLIc AUTHORITIES IN THE STATES 74 (1953). See note 84 infra.
As these figures demonstrate, the tax-exempt feature of authority bonds permits long term
borrowing at low rates; private capital generally cannot compete with authority capital.
Nonetheless, during a depression, owners of vacant buildings who have abandoned hope
for profits, could lease at competitive rates in an effort to minimize their losses.
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income. 9 Moreover, by and large private tenants are poorer credit risks than
government units. Accordingly, unless the government in question could not
pay its rent, bondholders might obtain an injunction against an attempt by
the authority to seek private tenants in lieu of a satisfactory public one. So
long as the government fulfills its obligations under the lease, the authority's
,duty to the bondholders dictates that the lease be continued. For similar
reasons, the authority cannot accept surrender, and it must seek renewal of
an annual lease.
Should the government default, however, duties to the bondholders would
no longer prevent the authority from interfering with the government's posses-
sion. Bondholders have no interest in leaving a nonpaying tenant undisturbed.
Their interests require the authority to invoke sanctions that will coerce pay-
ment from any tenant in default. The authority's right of entry for nonpayment
of rent is just such a sanction.
Not only would the authority's entry interrupt essential government activi-
ties, it would be financially coercive. Part of every rental payment advances
the retirement of the authority's bonds. After all the bonds have been retired
in twenty to fifty years, the government is entitled to occupy the facility rent-
free and thereafter pay only the cost of operation and maintenance-a sub-
stantial expectancy.70 If the rent is not paid, the bonds will not be retired on
schedule and enjoyment of the expectancy will thus be postponed. To stop
the rent while interest continues to accrue on the unretired principle is to
deplete sinking funds, if any, or to increase the outstanding obligation, possibly
to an amount in excess of the original bond issue. Even worse, if a government
wholly abandons the authority's project (by refusing to renew the lease under
the Alabama plan or by obtaining authority consent to termination or sur-
render under one of the other theories), that portion of previous rentals which
was allocated to debt retirement would be sacrificed in its entirety. The govern-
ment's expectancy has no value, of course, if the authority permits the govern-
ment to continue in possession though in default. The future right to rent-free
possession is not worth purchasing if the authority tolerates gratuitous oc-
cupancy. To give value to this expectancy, then, the authority must oust any
nonpaying tenant, thus coercing payment or effectively compelling the sur-
69. Interestingly enough, income from municpal revenue bonds issued to finance an
industrial plant built and operated by the municipality to attract industry is exempt from
the federal income tax, even though the muncipality's obligation to pay is limited to the
revenue derived from leases to private industrial tenants. Rev. Rul. 54-106, 1954-1 Cum.
BuLL. 28. However, where municipal repudiation of an authority's project deprived it of
all color of "public purpose," the bonds might lose their tax-exempt status.
70. If the Reynolds mortgage analogy is considered inapplicable, this expectancy
cannot properly be called an equity in the property. And if no provision requires title to
pass to the lessee government, the courts can honor the fiction that the lease does not
constitute a purchase contract and that the government does not have a vendee's equity.
Nonetheless, the financial fact remains; the cost of occupancy will not exceed the cost
of operation, maintenance and insurance when the debt is completely retired whether title
passes to the occupying government or remains in the name of the authority.
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render of the expectancy purchased with prior rentals. Should the authority
fail to enter, the bondholders may be able to oust the government by foreclosing
their mortgage, or in the absence of a mortgage, they may be able to have
the authority superseded by a receiver or a trustee under the bond indenture.
In turn, this official can be directed to proceed to protect the bondholders'
interests by entry or otherwise. Lacking these remedies, the bondholders may
be able to obtain an injunction or writ of mandamus ordering the authority
to enter.
7 '
In short, the authority's duties to the bondholders and their own remedies
in aid of those duties convert authority leases into governmental debts within
the meaning of the state constitutions, just as a pledge of government assets
converts an otherwise unenforceable claim into a debt. If a municipality pur-
chases the equity in mortgaged property but does not assume the mortgage, it
nevertheless is held indebted in the constitutional sense.72 Though not liable
on the secured debt, it must either redeem the property or suffer the loss of
payments previously made. These payments, then, become a pledge securing
the government's continued performance of the mortgagee's duties. Similarly,
that fraction of the rent which is paid to an authority and then is apportioned to
debt amortization serves as a pledge securing the lessee-government's continued
performance.
The Wisconsin courts recognize this functional nature of bondholders' reme-
dies in one type of case. Although building authorities have generally been
approved in Wisconsin, those constructing projects on government land have
encountered constitutional obstacles. One school district planned a rent-free
lease of land to an-authority which would build a school, and, in turn, lease
back the school to the district at a rent sufficient to service the bonds. The
court held that the mortgage securing these bonds was unconstitutional, since,
by permitting the authority to mortgage its leasehold, the school district had
pledged existing government property for the payment of rent.73 Although a
new plan eliminating the mortgage was then conceived, the court enlarged its
71. Building authority bonds are patterned after revenue bonds. Accordingly, the
same general kinds of sanctions are available to building authority bondholders as are
employed by holders of revenue bonds. Concerning revenue bondholders' remedies, see
Fordham, Revenue Bond Sanctions, 42 CoLUM. L. Rav. 395 (1942).
72. 15 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL COaROATIoNs 371 (3d ed. 1950); 1 DILLON, MUNICI-
P"AL CoRPoRATiols § 199 (5th ed. 1911). But see Burnham v. City of Milwaukee, 98 Wis.
128, 73 N.W. 1018 (1897) (although city entered contracts to purchase park lands, paid
part of price and was given possession of the lands, the vendors agreeing to convey title
upon payment of balance, the city was not indebted, in the constitutional sense, absent
an agreement to pay the remainder despite the fact that the contracts gave the vendors
a lien upon the property which could be foreclosed upon city's default) ; Connor v. City
of 'Marshfield, 128 Wis. 280, 107 N.W. 639 (1906) (city purchased waterworks from a
private corporation, subject to a mortgage securing bonds of the private corporation, but
the outstanding bonds were not regarded as debts of the city).
73. State ex rel. Rogers v. Milligan, 267 Wis. 549, 66 N.W.2d 326 (1954).
[Vol. 68: 234
PUBLIC BUILDING AUTHORITIES
earlier position and held that the authority's right of entry for nonpayment of
rent converted the leasehold into an unconstitutional pledge.
74
In another instance, the state planned to use the authority device to finance
a new wing for an existing office building. The original scheme was held uncon-
stitutional because the state proposed to lease the entire building to the authority
free of rent, and the authority's bonds were to be secured by a mortgage of its
leasehold. 75 Consequently, by a second legislative plan, the state was directed
to sell the authority the existing building together with the adjacent land for
$125,000. The authority's bonds, which financed not only the cost of the new
wing but also the price of the fee, were then to be secured by a mortgage.
Since, upon foreclosure the state would not suffer forfeiture, as it no longer
owned any part of the project, this arrangement was adjudged constitutional.76
As precedent for its view, the Wisconsin court cited its own revenue bond
case 77 which adopted the restricted special-fund theory. Since Wisconsin has
not attempted to justify building authorities under the special-fund theory, this
restriction is doctrinally inapposite. However, the rationale of the restricted
special-fund theory might be equally applicable to building authorities. The
theory permits purchase-money mortgages of revenue-producing projects and
only forbids mortgages upon existing projects presently unencumbered. The
threat of foreclosure might be equally coercive in either case. The distinction,
however, can be rationalized on the ground that, in each, a different community
is coerced. According to the special-fund theory, revenue bonds are not debts
of the issuing government, which merely acts as an agent for collection from
the community of users. Since the equity subject to a purchase-money mort-
gage is built by user charges, the threat of foreclosure may coerce the com-
munity of users who paid for it, but not the community of electors. Foreclosure
of a mortgage upon previously unencumbered government property, however,
would coerce the government, in that the community of electors would be
impelled to redeem its former asset.73 It is not the purpose of this article to
74. State ex rel. Rogers v. Milligan, 269 Wis. 565, 69 N.W.2d 485 (1955).
75. State ex rel. Thomson v. Giessel, 267 Wis. 331, 65 N.W.2d 529 (1954).
76. State ex rel. Thomson v. Giessel, 271 Wis. 15, 72 N.W.2d 577 (1955).
77. State ex rel. Morgan v. City of Portage, 174 Wis. 588, 184 N.W. 376 (1921).
78. Although no judicial pronouncement expressly adopts this rationalization, it seems
implicit in City of Joliet v. Alexander, 194 Ill. 457, 62 N.E. 861 (1902), the leading case
on the restricted special-fund theory. The Joliet court held unconstitutional a plan to
finance improvements of a municipal water system with revenue bonds payable from the
income of the entire system and secured by a mortgage upon the old system and the
improvements. The court reasoned that the plan would be constitutional if -analogous
to financing local improvements with warrants payable only from a special assessment
against benefited property. The analogy proved incomplete.
A special assessment is a lien upon individual property and not upon property
of the city, but in this case the holders of certificates would have a right to take
and appropriate a pre-existing income of the city for the payment of the certificates
and also to enforce payment by a sale of property of the city. The certificates would
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investigate the validity of revenue bond financing. In fact, these two com-
munities often are substantially the same. In revenue bond cases, there is at
least a colorable argument that the two communities differ. For example,
turnpikes are used by cars from other states, and foreign corporations have
local stores and plants which use water and sewage facilities. On the other
hand, in most building authority cases, the two communities coincide. The
government that contributes the initial capital, such as land, is the same govern-
ment that pays the expectancy-creating rent. If, therefore, a building authority's
right of entry compels payment in cases in which the government has con-
tributed initial capital assets to the project, it is also coercive when the govern-
ment has previously increased the project's net worth by paying the costs of
debt amortization.
It follows, then, that, in the absence of facts making the special-fund theory
applicable, the building authority device creates a debt in the constitutional
sense. The authority and the leasing government are functionally so integrated
that to construe the authority as an independent body is to mistake form for
substance. Not only does the government require the project for its functions,
but that part of the rent which amortizes the debt also becomes a pledge
securing the government's future performance. To protect this pledge and
continue its functions, the government must seek renewal of the annual leases
executed under the Alabama plan, and cannot terminate the long-term contracts
permitted in other states. To fulfill its obligations to its bondholders, the author-
ity is similarly inhibited, unless the lessee-government is behind in its rent. In
be in no sense chargeable upon the property of individuals, but solely upon the
income and property of the city, including property already owned by the city.
Id. at 465, 62 N.E. at 864. Implicit here is a distinction between the community of bene-
fited land owners and the community of electors.
No language in the Wisconsin cases indicates that the distinction between approved
purchase-money mortgages and all other mortgages is rationalized in this manner. To
the contrary, there is reason to believe that the Wisconsin court has no theory to justify
this distinction. Firstly, the Wisconsin courts have expressly held that threat of foreclosure
is not so coercive of payment as to require forbidding a city to buy property subject to a
lien where the city does not contractually assume the debt secured. Burnham v. City of
Milwaukee, 98 Wis. 128, 73 N.W. 1018 (1897) ; Connor v. City of Marshfield, 128 Wis.
280, 107 N.W. 639 (1906). Secondly, the courts have not applied the restricted special-
fund theory when the revenue producing facility was constructed upon land purchased
especially for the project, even though the land was purchased with general government
funds and was encumbered by a mortgage securing the bonds issued to finance the projects.
Morris v. Ellis, 221 Wis. 307, 266 N.W. 921 (1936). In view of these precedents, the
school building authority cases and the state office building wing cases, notes 73-76 supra,
stand only for the proposition that a security transaction may encumber previously owned
assets only if, in connection with the plan, the assets have been altered in character.
Under those cases, if the lien encumbers assets which the government contributes in
kind, such as land, the plan is unconstitutional. If, on the other hand, the government pur-
chases land especially for the project, as in the Morris case, or purchases an equity in a
mortgaged water system, as in the Burnham case, the plan is constitutional because the
assets were not previously owned in kind but are the successors to previously owned money.
This position is indefensible.
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fact, the authority's power to terminate the lease, rather than indicating that
no debt is involved, proves that the rent obligation is actually a debt, since by
the exercise of this power the authority can coerce payment. The Reynolds
case therefore seems the most perceptive in this area. Its analogy to a deed
of trust in the nature of a mortgage is singularly apposite. The trustee's strict
duties owed the lenders limit his function and reduce him to a contractual
device. The authority's duties to the bondholders similarly color the entire
building authority device and convert the "rents" into "debts. 79
THE CONSEQUENCES
No satisfactory theory has been advanced which justifies exempting the
building authority device from constitutional debt limits. Of course, peculiar
circumstances may bring an authority within the special-fund theory, but such
a transaction would not require an authority for its constitutionality. Absent
such peculiar facts which in themselves would exempt the debt from the con-
stitutional limit, the building authority device constitutes a flagrant violation
of state constitutions. Conceptually, therefore, the integrity of constitutional
government dictates that either the building authority device or the provisions
restricting government debt be abandoned.
Actually, however, the principle of constitutional supremacy has never been
controlling in this area, inasmuch as the entire history of debt limits is one of
evasion. The three evasive theories mentioned at the beginning of this article
rest upon foundations almost as weak as the building authority device itself.
An executory contract, as a matter of fact, is not easily avoided should the
government later find it excessively burdensome. Special districts are often
merely bureaus of a traditional unit of government, and their corporate form
79. This analysis cannot be applied with equal vigor to all Wisconsin building authori-
ties, however. In order to permit projects on government land, some of those authorities
eschew all security. Not only is there no mortgage securing the bonds, but the authority
has expressly waived its right of entry for nonpayment of rent. This kind of transaction
was held constitutional in State ex rel. Thomson v. Giessel, 271 Wis. 15, 72 N.W.2d 577
(1955).
Clearly, the mere failure to pay rent would not jeopardize the government's right to
occupy the project. Thus, the authority could not force the government to sacrifice its
expectancy. However, the government would still be liable for each installment of rent
as it came due. Though this obligation runs only to the authority-lessor, the bondholders
can have the benefit of it in a suit by the indenture trustee, if any, or by a receiver appointed
pursuant to a creditor's bill. The obligation, therefore, appears to have all the attributes
of a debt, though a default could not accelerate the due dates of future installments.
The absence of all security provisions does not bolster the validity of the Wisconsin
common-law rationale that rents are not debts. Though the lack of security provisions
makes a default less disastrous to the government-lessee, it does not affect the authority's
duty to its creditors. The authority cannot evict or accept surrender from the lessee so
long as it is able to pay the rent. Only the tactics of the situation are changed. Upon default,
the authority must sue on each installment as it matures and must not jeopardize similar
causes of action in the future by interfering with the government's right to possession under
the lease.
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should be considered incidental.80 Special funds are special largely because
the government designates them as such. This accounting procedure may have
little functional significance. The sponsoring government, to preserve its good
name in financial circles, may have to assume special-fund obligations should
the fund prove inadequate. Also, a special fund's creditors, pursuing their
remedies, may coerce payment from the general fund, for the foreclosure of a
mortgage securing special-fund obligations can be as onerous to the government
as the foreclosure of a mortgage securing general obligations. And if fore-
closure is unavailable, the holders of defaulted bonds may compel an increase
of rates payable to the special fund.8s This, in turn, may induce the rate-payers
to exercise their political power to force the government into assuming the
debt or making periodic additional payments to preserve the existing rates.
The building authority is, then, merely a new device which, in the tradition
of its predecessors, flouts the constitution. Like the others, it has had a mixed
judicial reception, depending upon the relative values that courts have accorded
constitutional principles and the government's obligation to fulfill popular
needs. Not unexpectedly, the courts have held building authorities constitu-
tional for reasons other than those given in the cases. Judicial approval of
the authorities indicates a recognition of the facts that the capital needs of
government must be met, and that debt limits, as they now stand, prohibit a
government from fulfilling the functions expected of it.
Though the building authority device is, strictly speaking, repugnant to
constitutional government, it is consistent with democratic government. Build-
ing authorities have been established by acts of responsible legislatures or
pursuant to the enabling acts of those legislatures. Generally, the limitations
upon the powers of representative bodies are not strictly honored unless they
are considered essential to certain democratic concepts. Substantive due pro-
cess is in eclipse except in the field of civil rights, education and other areas
buttressed by equalitarian considerations and the needs of representative gov-
ernment. The judicial approval of building authorities created by democratic,
representative bodies is part of this trend.
82
This is, perhaps, as it should be. Certainly, public attitudes toward public
debt have changed greatly in this century. Though morality still requires a
balanced budget or a surplus to reduce outstanding governmental debt, this ethi-
cal mandate has become a hope rather than a guiding principle. The electorate
might not, today, consider government debt an evil which should be con-
80. If the chief officials of the district are appointed by a traditional unit of govern-
ment, the district closely resembles a department of the appointing government. Even
if the chief officers are elected, the similarity is not destroyed, for lesser administrative
offices are not uncommonly elective.
Indeed, some authorities have recognized that a special district may merely be a bureau
in corporate clothing. See Annot., 171 A.L.R. 729 (1947).
81. Fordham, Revenue Bond Sanctions, 42 CoLum. L. REv. 395, 419-39 (1942).
82. An additional example may be drawn from the field of corporate law. There,




stitutionally banned. Imprudent debt, like any other government imprudence,
should be avoided, but the electorate might think that this can best be accom-
plished by electing prudent officials.
Nonetheless, those courts which have approved building authorities have
deprived the electorate of an opportunity to express its changed attitude in
this field directly. "Debt" is not a pleasant word. It denotes something bad.
No one is for it for its own sake. Since an intelligent appraisal of debt is
possible only in the face of a choice between either foregoing debt or foregoing
its benefits, the courts, by permitting some benefits of debt through building
authorities, have deprived the electorate of an opportunity to make an intelli-
gent choice.
This has not been accomplished without cost. The financial community ac-
cepts building authority bonds less readily than it does direct government obli-
gations. Accordingly, interest rates range from one half of one per cent to one
per cent higher upon building authority bonds than upon full-faith-and-credit
government obligations.8 3 The effect of this can be evaluated from the follow-
ing example. If a government borrows directly at 22 per cent and retires
the debt over a thirty-year period, it annually must budget $47.78 for every
$1000 originally borrowed. But if, by using a building authority, it must
accept a 32 per cent interest rate, that same $47.78 per year will carry only
$878.79 of original debt. Thus, for the same annual cost, the government is
forced to borrow 12 per cent less. Put the other way, to obtain the same total
loan, the government must pay an additional $6.59 per thousand-some 14 per
cent, in annual cost.8 4 Therefore, a government which utilizes a building
authority to sidestep debt limits must either forego the full benefit of its credit
by borrowing less or else increase taxes and the possibility of default as well.
In sum, the debt limit, a symbol of financial prudence in the nineteenth century,
has ironically spawned a financially imprudent instrumentality in the twentieth.
It might appear, then, that the courts should have held building authorities
83. Ellinwood, Use of Special Authorities to Finance School Improvements, 25
MuNIcIPAL FINANCE 48, 52 (1953); COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, PUBLIC A.UTH RI-
TIES IN THE STATES 70-74 (1953); Magnusson, Lease-Financing by Municipal Corpora-
tions as a Way Around Debt Limitations, 25 GRo. WASH. L. REv. 377, 395-96 (1957).
84. The following table, extracted from COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, op. cit. supra
note 83, at 74, gives the annual cost of a $1,000 loan over selected periods at various
interest rates.
Rate of Interest 20 years 30 years 37 years 50 years
2.0% $61.16 $44.65 $38.51 $31.82
2.5 64.15 47.78 41.74 35.26
3.0 67.22 51.02 45.11 38.87
3.5 70.36 54.37 48.61 42.63
4.0 73.58 57.83 52.24 46.55
4.5 76.87 61.39 55.98 50.60
If the use of an authority inflated the rate from 2Y2% to 3% in the textual example, the
annual cost per thousand would increase from $47.78 to $51.02-nearly 7%. If the borrow-
ing government could not assume this added burden, borrowing power would diminish
to $936.50, a loss of more than 6%
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unconstitutional and thereby forced the legislatures to re-evaluate the current
consensus on public debt. As a result, debt limits might have been repealed
tor revised, in order to relieve government of its nineteenth-century straight
jacket and permit the exercise of twentieth-century functions.
The experience in Maine and Georgia, however, indicates that such judicial
firmness might prove vain. After the Reynolds case had effectively barred
building authorities in Maine, there were no further attempts to use the device
until 1951. That year, the court held a state office building authority uncon-
stitutional s5 and restricted the usefulness of the recently established Maine
School Building Authority by holding that it could only rent projects to munici-
palities whose outstanding debt, when added to the cost of the school building,
remained within permissible constitutional limits. 8 6 Thereafter, the Maine
constitution was amended by appending to the section limiting municipal debts
the proviso, "Long term rental agreements not exceeding forty years under
contracts with the Maine School Building Authority shall not be debts or
liabilities within the provisions of this section."
87
Georgia has had a similar history. The Supreme Court of Georgia refused
at an early date to extend to multiyear contracts the executory-contract
exception to the debt limit.88 Seeking a way to permit local governments to
finance hospitals, the legislature proposed a constitutional amendment author-
izing local governments to lease projects from authorities.8 9 This amendment
was adopted and, in 1955, enlarged to permit the state and its agencies, as well
as counties and municipalities, to rent any project from any authority for a
period not exceeding fifty years. 0 Although the first opinion concerning the
amendment held that the debt limit still applied to authority leases-thus
necessitating a statute similar to Alabama's 91-subsequent cases exempted
authority leases from the debt limit.92
85. Opinion of the Justices, 146 Me. 183, 79 A.2d 753 (1951).
86. Opinion of the Justices, 146 Me. 295, 80 A.2d 869 (1951).
87. Ma. CoNsT. art. IX, § 15. The amendment had a stormy history. The debt limit
not only inhibited necessary school construction, but other projects as well. Consequently,
in 1951 the legislature proposed two amendments, each of which detailed a proposed section
15. The first proposal raised the debt limit from 5% to 7'A%. It was defeated by the
electorate. The second amendment, as set forth in text, was adopted by the electorate as
Amendment LXXIII and proclaimed by the Governor on September 26, 1951. In 1954
the legislature again proposed an amendment to elevate the debt limit to 730%. The School
Building Authority exception, which had been adopted in the meantime, was omitted.
This amendment was adopted by the electorate as Amendment LXXVI and proclaimed
by the Governor on September 21, 1954, thus inadvertently repealing the proviso adopted
in 1951. Opinion of the Justices, 150 Me. 362, 134 A.2d 511 (1955). A third amendment,
Amendment LXXX, re-enacting the proviso, was proposed, adopted and promulgated by
the Governor on September 26, 1955.
88. City Council v. Dawson Waterworks Co., 106 Ga. 696, 32 S.E. 907 (1899).
89. See DeJarnette v. Hospital Authority, 195 Ga. 189, 23 S.E.2d 716 (1942).
90. GA. CoNsr. art. VII, § VI, para. 1.
91. DeJarnette v. Hospital Authority, 195 Ga. 189, 23 S.E2d 716 (1942).
92. Sheffield v. State School Bldg. Authority, 208 Ga. 575, 68 S.E.2d 590 (1952);
McLucas v. State Bridge Bldg. Authority, 210 Ga. 1, 77 S.E.2d 531 (1953).
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The Maine and Georgia amendments are expensive, patchwork remedies
when compared to outright repeal of the debt limit. Authority leases, and
hence the bonds behind them, are limited to forty or fifty years. While Georgia
permits almost any kind of project to be leased from any authority,93 in Maine,
only leases from the School Building Authority avoid the debt limit, and prob-
ably all Maine projects must be related to education. Also, the School Build-
ing Authority has discretion to refuse to finance projects which it feels would
overburden the municipality's budget. 94
These restrictions, if desirable, could have been included more economically
in a constitutional amendment which permits direct-obligation borrowing, since
government bonds would permit lower interest rates than are possible when
an authority is interposed between the bondholders and the ultimate obligor,
the government. In other states, where building authorities are judicially
tolerated, legislators might accept the higher cost of authority finance as prefer-
able to a public campaign to amend the constitution. Maine and Georgia, how-
ever, undertook such campaigns. Why, then, did they retain authorities?
Although legal materials shed little light upon the political history of these
amendments, an understanding of the slogans involved may well provide the
answer. Public debt, though no longer anathema, is still not accepted unemo-
tionally. "Debt" is a fundamentally immoral word to large segments of the
electorate. In contrast, the wording of the Georgia and Maine amendments,
permitting leases, does not flag this emotional fear.9 5 Renting, after all, is
regarded as the practice of an honorable man who needs the use of a facility
93. Well, nearly any authority. A Georgia plan whereby the state highway department
was to rent a project built in Georgia by the Florida Ocean Highway and Port Authority
was held unconstitutional in State v. Blasingame, 212 Ga. 222, 91 S.E.2d 341 (1956). Said
the court, "It would be difficult to conceive of a deliberate intention upon the part of the
people of Georgia to authorize by the Constitution contracts by the State and its sub-
divisions with agencies . . . of a communistic country for the performance by such com-
munistic agencies of governmental functions within the State of Georgia." Id. at 225,
91 S.E.2d at 343. Apparently, in Georgia, foreigners are foreigners and since leases with
communistic agencies are taboo, so are those with Florida authorities.
94. The extent to which the Maine School Building Authority Act is incorporated
by reference in the constitutional amendment, quoted in text accompanying note 88 supra,
is uncertain. Could the legislature amend the act to require the Authority to issue bonds
for all school authorities who make demand, regardless of their financial condition? Could
the legislature permit the Authority to finance a swimming pool to be used both for educa-
tion and recreation? A pool to be used only for recreation? A new city hall in Waterville,
if it contained office space for the local school officials? These questions may not merely be
academic. As the history of the Maine amendments indicates, the public works crisis in
Maine is not limited to schools. Note 87 supra. Industrial and commercial progress will
probably increase the need for public works and it is not unlikely that the legislature will
respond by extending the Maine School Building Authority's sphere of operation without
an additional constitutional amendment.
95. Perhaps this factor caused the electorate of Maine, when offered both a con-
stitutional amendment which raised the debt limit and one permitting a building authority,
to reject the proposal raising the debt limit and to adopt the amendment permitting the
authority. See note 87 supra.
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which he cannot afford to purchase. Practical politicians, then, would rather
support the building authority device than a repeal or liberalization of the debt
limit. Thus, in circumventing the debt-limit barrier to desirable public projects
Americans have adapted their institutions to their moral slogans. In the
process, they have paid, and pay, unnecessarily high interest rates-the price
of apparent virtue.9
96. The history of debt limits is merely a recent chapter in the long history of com-
mercial taboos and their evasion. In the middle ages, borrowing was not thought dishonor-
able, but charging of interest, no matter how little, was considered usurious and condemned
by law and church. One evasive device employed a combination of three contracts. Bor-
rower and lender would form a partnership, the lender supplying the capital. The borrower
would then insure the lender against loss. Finally, the lender would sell his share of
the uncertain future profits to the borrower for a sum certain. "There was no reason
why the three contracts-the partnership agreement, the insurance contract and the sale
of a future uncertain profit-each one legal in itself, should be presumed to be illegal
when entered into by the same two persons. This so-called triple contract (contractus
trinus), which became an established practise in the latter part of the fifteenth century,
was in effect an agreement with all the implications of a modern loan transaction." Salin,
Usury, 15 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 193, 196 (1934). Similarly, an authority's
happy combination of lease and special district, each considered legal in itself, is often
upheld and the concerted effect ignored.
Even the respectable leasehold was originally an evasive device.
In the English feudal economy prior to the thirteenth century . . . leases, rather
than being for purposes of husbandry, probably were used most frequently as
devises to evade the laws against usury. A, being in need of funds, would make
a lease for years to B for a lump-sum consideration paid in advance. B would
expect to recoup the consideration and a profit from the use of the land during
the term. This was the so-called premium lease. The modern mortgage grew out
of a somewhat similar use of the lease where a debt was created and the lease
served as security.
1 AmEIcAN LAw OF PRz'TY § 3.1 (Casner ed. 1952).
Thus have commercial needs been accommodated to current law and morality.
